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the one they pick's the one you'll know .by

I

CAN'T UNDERSTAND HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN,

but when I first entered his classroom thirty years
ago he was a good dozen years younger than the
professor my students meet in my classroom. He
seemed old to me then: perhaps it was because his
graying flat-top that seemed to spike at the sides
gave him a wizened, owl-like look. Perhaps at that
time people in their late thirties really were much
older than freshman college students. Or, perhaps
he seemed old because-as I know now that he
would have wished-in his classroom he became
one with the ancient texts we were studying.
Introduction to the Bible, my first class with
him, met four days a week, at 8:00 am. And class
began promptly at eight, when he closed and
locked the door. We were permitted only three
absences, so missing class could be costly. Early in
the semester slightly tardy students would knock
on the locked door, requesting entry. He would
shout at us, "Go away! We began at eight!" We got
the message. No exceptions were made to accommodate us.
Class began with a daily quiz on the assigned
reading-one question, often on what I then
considered an obscure point in the text, perhaps a
name no one should be expected to remember. His
response: one either read carefully or one didn't.
The quizzes were graded and returned the next
morning and, on the same sheet of paper we wrote
the next quiz answer, and the next, and the next.
Mter the quiz he lectured, sometimes clarifying
the secondary text, sometimes disagreeing with it;
often introducing new material that illuminated the
biblical texts with which we dealt; often introducing new material that had no bearing upon the
biblical texts we were studying, so far as I could
see. At these times I was impatient with him, something I think he knew, and knew better than to care
much about. He was an archaeologist by training.
He knew the biblical material we were studying
and its social and historical context. He knew what
was interesting and what was important. His classroom was not the place to satisfy the demands of
even his relatively bright students. Something more
important than our wishes was going on in the
classroom. Truth was at stake, and an excellence in
the pursuit of that truth.

When we studied the creation narratives, he
was an ancient Israelite who understood how his
God both resembled and differed from the other
gods. He could be J, D, P, or E. He was a chronicler of conquests, a psalmist who sang of God's
closeness, and of God's abandonment of him. He
was, most memorably, a prophet who raged against
our materialism and, in the class before our
Thanksgiving break, suggested to us that we
deserved to "choke on the turkeys we would soon
be gorging on" while others went hungry.
He had a reputation for being a most
demanding teacher, and that was my experience of
him. His reading assignments were lengthy, and
always followed in the morning by those wretched
daily quizzes. His tests required knowledge of intimate details as well as a grasp of the big picture and
a concern for its relevance to our lives. He
demanded from us research, providing tools that
would · stretch us if we allowed. He recognized
shoddy work for what it was, and graded it accordingly. It is hard to recover from a well-deserved D
on a major project; hard, as well, to live with
having disappointed one's mentor.
And he was my mentor for the two and a half
years I studied at that college. He was probably
teaching at least five courses a semester with few, if
any, repeat courses in the second semester. If I
came to his small office-stuffed with books and
cluttered with papers stacked and strewn in a
system even he could only occasionally graspwhen he was busy, he would curtly tell me to come
back later. I always came back later. And he always
found the time for me, and found the time for
whatever new request I placed upon him. Yes, of
course, he would do that independent study with
me, but I would have to do this and this and this.
Yes, he would provide me with a reading list, but he
couldn't do it before .... He loved his students as
much as he loved his studies. We knew as much.
Not long ago retired, W.H.F.K. died this year at
the age of 69. Some of his recent retirement timeeven following a serious automobile accident-he
had spent teaching Latin to nearby high school
students. He could not stop teaching; the students
and what they might learn mattered too much. He
died having written little that appears on the book-

shelves of scholars but having produced and
published much for his small church denomination. For his students, he produced more than he
could have imagined.
He was one of a kind. And yet, I suspect, there
are many like him in the small colleges that dot our
landscape. Scholars of the highest caliber who both
demand and greet first-rate scholarship, though they
recognize for themselves a different calling than
scholarly publication. Teachers who would first of all
honor the excellence of the research and writing of
others, even as they themselves pursue excellence in
the teaching of their disciplines, even as they initiate
and care for students undertaking those studies.
A middle-aged teacher, I know that it is no easy
thing to inspire; it is far easier to take the sardonic

stance that appeals to the cynical (and there will
always be cynical eighteen to twenty-one year
olds). But the hells of youth deserve more and
better than an elder's mirror-hells; this, the
memory of W.H.F.K. reminds me. Better for the
young are the dreams inspired by a meeting with
Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. As W.H.F.K. realized,
we teach our subjects, but, inevitably, we also teach
ourselves-fragile, shallow selves if not attended
to, or selves that can be healed and made whole by
our encounters with God. And selves that can for
some happy, fleeting moments, loose themselves in
a reality larger than themselves, thus conveying an
education worthy of human nature.

f
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JONAH'S DREAM
He slept most of the time,
swaddled in the black belly,
sleep broken only when the walls
squeezed in or when a gush
of bile burned his flesh.
While he slept, he dreamedalways the same-a hand
breaks through the murky
darkness, burrows into his chest,
clutches his heart. Unable
to see, he is endlessly
dragged by this hand in his heart.
He wakes up face down
in whale vomit glowing purple
in the moonlight. As he washes
his face in the endless sea,
he wishes the hand would tear
his heart out and leave
him alone, lifeless,
finally at rest.

Travis Scholl
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liberal learning and the light of faith:
an initiation into wholeness
Jeanne Heffernan

That matter is subject to the laws of physics is
not the problem. Wendell Berry objects to the notion
education and consider the role that Christians are
that everything tangible is reducible to and, as Wtlson
to play in it, I immediately turn to my intellectual
argues, determined by, the laws of physics. Wilson's
heroes for wisdom. Let me call these people "signreductionism is thoroughgoing; there is no room
posts in a strange land," borrowing the title of
here for a non-material explanation of anything in
Patrick Samway's volume on Walker Percy. Among
our experience. Even meaning itself succumbs to the
their number I would include such diverse thinkers
cold clutches of scientific reductionism. As Wtlson
as Wendell Berry, John Paul II, and Cardinal
reveals, "What we call meaning is the linkage among
Newman. The signposts tell us that something is
the neural networks created by the spreading excitaamiss. They alert us to the fact that, yes, we inhabit
tion that enlarges imagery and
a strange land. But what makes the
land-our land, the land of the I think that our land is engages emotion." Berry rightly
points out that "[t]his idea is explicacademy, not to mention the larger
strange because it is
itly imperialistic, and it is implicitly
culture-strange? I think that our
too flat-its surface
tyrannical. Mr. Wilson is perfectly
land is strange because it is too flat;
has
been
reduced,
frank about his territorial ambiits surface has been reduced,
leveled, so that what tions. He wishes to see all the discileveled, so that what were once
mountains are barely molehills. Or,
were once mountains plines linked or unified-but strictly
on the basis of science." With
better, what are mountains are
are barely molehills.
now reckoned as molehills. Our
meaning reduced to molecules, the
Or, better, what are
profoundest insights of all the discitopographical map is askew.
mountains are now
plines are imperiled. Contrasting
How so? Well, if Wendell Berry
reckoned as molehills. the world of Shakespeare's King
is right, and I think he is, we've
Lear with Wilson's laboratory,
taken our map from the wrong
Our topographical
Berry notes that only in the former
surveyors. The academy's most
map is askew.
is there a genuine place for the
illustrious mapmakers are reducmiraculous and mysterious.
tionists; their equipment is suited to
But then how has Wilson been able to concoct
studying small bits of earth, but they presume to
such a scheme? What has happened here? For
measure the whole world with it, to compass the
Berry, the fact that Wilson can seriously propound
horizon using a microscopic lens. For Wendell Berry,
the theory of consilience and the fact that he has
chief among misguided mapmakers is Harvard
been richly rewarded for it with accolades and a
sociobiologist E. 0 . Wilson. Wtlson is a very clever
prestigious post in the academy testifies to the fact
scientist; this Berry grants. But he is a poor philosothat the university is lost. It has no meaningful
pher, theologian, and political theorist. Does Wilson
unity, but is fragmented, and split into different
claim these areas of expertise? Not exactly. But he
territories, each speaking hyper-specialized
presumes to speak on all of them because his
method is imperialistic: it conquers every territory
languages. As Berry argues in "The Loss of the
University" in Life is a Miracle, there is no common
of knowledge and becomes its master. In Wilson's
own words, "all tangible phenomena, from the birth
tongue with which to communicate, no forum
within which to discuss-and defend-one's ideas.
of stars to the workings of social institutions, are
Thus, safely distant from theologians and Christian
based on material processes that are ultimately
literary scholars, an E. 0. Wilson can say that
reducible to ... the laws of physics."
WHENEVER I SURVEY THE SCENE IN HIGHER

Milton's own testimony notwithstanding, Paradise
Lost owes nothing to God's inspiration. Without
challenge, Wilson is allowed to rest in what E. F.
Schumacher called "a methodical aversion to the
recognition of higher levels ... of significance."

tively, the liberal arts in and of themselves can
begin one's initiation into wholeness.
Consider this scenario. A non-believing
student with an empirical, pragmatic bent enrolls
in a state university. He declares a chemistry
major, loads up on natural science courses, and
quickly refines his grasp and practice of the scienTHIS IS NOT A PROBLEM IN THE NATURAL
tific method; its precision profoundly shapes his
habit of mind. Flush with his newfound knowlsciences alone; so many of our disciplines fall prey
edge, he examines everything-even his girlto a similar reductionism. This is the predicament
friend-according to its chemical components.
of the modern university. But it was not always so;
(This, of course, gets him in trouble!) But in the
this radical fragmentation of knowledge is a relatively recent thing. As H. ]. Massingham has
following semester, he begins to satisfy his general
education requirements with courses on British
observed, "Modern knowledge is departmentalized," whereas, he continues, "the essence of
literature, Western civilization, and art history.
Suddenly, he's taken aback. The tools which had
culture is initiation into wholeness, so that all the
served him so well in the lab offer little assistance
divisions of knowledge are considered as the
in interpreting George Herbert or understanding
branches of one tree, the Tree of Life whose roots
Augustine's Confessions or accounting for the
go deep into the earth and whose top is in heaven."
paintings of Giotto. Herbert evokes in him a fasciHere is an alternative, and I think recoverable,
nation with language-with the way in which
vision of learning. This vision is guided by what the
finite forms gesture toward transcendence.
medievals called adaequatio rei et intellectus: the
Augustine prompts a new and strange self-examiprinciple that the understanding of the knower
nation. Giotto whets his appetite for beauty. All of
must be adequate to the thing to be known. To put
this is mysterious to him, and he can't reduce it to
it simply, there are different ways to know different
the proportions of chemistry. He has experienced
things; and there are different ways to know the
intimations of something beyond.
same things. Take a book. Let's say
And,
like the unforgettable Binx
the Bible, a first edition King James
To put it positively,
Bolling in Walker Percy's The
at that. Now, a physicist can tell us
the liberal arts
Moviegoer, he undertakes a search;
a great deal about the atomic partiin and of themselves he has thus begun the initiation
cles of its parchment; a chemist
can begin one's
into wholeness.
about the carbon remaining in its
initiation
into
What may deliver him into a
pages; a linguist about its distincfuller
wholeness? The light of faith.
tive verbal forms; a religious histowholeness.
It is the leaven his liberal arts
rian about the social and political
studies need in order to rise to new heights, for a
context of its creation. Yet none of these has
Christian perspective markedly changes learning.
comprehended its meaning; each has added to our
What might it mean to view education, and specifunderstanding, yes, but none is adequate to the full
ically higher education, from a Christian perspecreality of the object; the proper bounds of the
tive? I think it entails at least two things: a certain
disciplines prevent this.
This is why we have universities, ideally
orientation toward learning and a sense of the
communities of learners who complement one
proper breadth of education.
another's work in an effort to understand the
Christian orientation toward learning
whole. The recovery of the liberal arts taking place
A Christian orientation toward learning, as I
in many of our colleges and universities is a step in
see it, is an openness to the truth that is marked by
the right direction. Baylor's Interdisciplinary Core,
Pepperdine's Great Books Program, and
wonder and gratitude. James Taylor in his remarkable Poetic Knowledge: The Recovery of Education
Valparaiso's Christ College curriculum come to
describes wonder as "an emotion of fear, a fear
mind in this connection. Even in secular universiproduced by the consciousness of ignorance,
ties, the study of the liberal arts promises some
which, because it is man's natural desire (good) to
protection against reductionism. To put it posi-

Now
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know ... is perceived as a kind of evil." Ignorance
is a kind of deprivation, the awareness of which
produces fear. Think of walking into a great study
filled from floor to ceiling with beautiful books and
at once feeling surges of anxiety as well as excitement and desire. We are aware that we don't know
the riches the books contain; we're daunted by this
fact, and yet we're drawn to the books just the
same; we want to know. As Taylor reckons, this is
what Plato and Aristotle understood as wonder, the
existential starting point of philosophy.

RTO

AND ARBTOUE ILWMJNATED MUCH ABOJJf

the experience of wonder and the birth of philosophy in the soul; they were great teachers. But it
seems to me that what we learn from revelation
adds immeasurably to our orientation toward
learning, because we know from God's self-disclosure to the Jews and, even more, in his Incarnation
in Christ that the unmoved mover of the ancients
is actually a personal God-so personal that we call
him Father-who created the world out of
generosity, who considered his creation very good,
and who so loved the world even after it rebelled
that he sent his only Son to die for its salvation.
This prepares us, it seems to me, to approach the
learning process not only with wonder, but also
with profound gratitude. Everything about our
Christian story should encourage this, for we see
from start to finish that self-giving love is the very
ground of existence; it is the deepest truth about
the world. It is out of this love that we have been
given everything-from the creation of the world
to its salvation-as a gift. And the proper way to
receive a gift is in gratitude. Thus, the Christian
can affirm what Socrates expressed so well about
education in the Republic, namely, "the object of
education is to teach us to love what is beautiful,"
to which she will add, "and to be grateful to her
heavenly Father for it."
Christian revelation also informs us that the
context within which all learning takes place is a
great drama. Think about these biblical themes: the
way of life versus the way of death; truth in contest
with falsehood; the forces of light arrayed against
the powers of darkness; heaven and hell. Human
life is charged with supernatural meaning, meaning
that transcends the bounds of time and history. As
Pope John Paul II explains in his encyclical The

Gospel of Life:

Man is called to a fullness of life which far
exceeds the dimensions of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very
life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural
vocation reveals the greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its
temporal phase. Life in time, in fact, is the
fundamental condition, the initial stage and
an integral part of the entire unified process
of human existence. It is a process which,
unexpectedly and undeservedly, is enlightened by the promise and renewed by the gift
of divine life, which will reach its full realization in eternity (cf. 1 John 3:1-2). At the
same time, it is precisely this supernatural
calling which highlights the relative character of each individual's earthly life. After
all, life on earth is not an "ultimate" but a
"penultimate" reality; even so, it remains a
sacred reality entrusted to us, to be preserved
with a sense of responsibility and brought to
perfection in love and in the gift of ourselves
to God and to our brothers and sisters.

If we understand life as a sacred reality, entrusted
to us, we will insist that education remain faithful
to the supernatural dimensions and destiny of the
human person. Our thoughts about education will
begin, as Jacques Maritain's did, with a consideration of the essence of man. "Man," in Maritain's
words, "is a person, who holds himself in hand by
his intelligence and his will. He does not merely
exist as a physical being. There is in him a richer
and nobler existence; he has spiritual superexistence through knowledge and love." Thus, contra
E. 0. Wilson, Maritain insists that man "is in some
way, a whole, not merely a part; he is a universe
unto himself, a microcosm in which the great
universe in its entirety can be encompassed
through knowledge. And through love he can give
himself freely to beings who are to him, as it were,
other selves; and for this relationship no equivalent
can be found in the physical world."
a sense of the breadth of education
Man is in some way a whole, a universe unto
himself, and education should be commensurate to
his stature; this is the second insight a Christian
perspective offers. Education must reflect the
height, depth, and breadth of human experience,
attending to the body, soul, and spirit, to time and

eternity. It must, in short, guard against reducbriefly sketch how such a person might apply in a
tionism. It should not attempt to understand the
practical way what she has learned. Having spent
human experience according to the epistemologthe last year in Washington, I am sensitive to how
ical constraints of any one discipline, nor should it
pressing the need for Christian wholeness is in the
focus on a narrow and limited goal, such as "career
world of policymaking, a world often marked by
preparation."
ideologically drawn categories and a frightening
reductionism. By contrast, instead of working
Instead, as Wendell Berry has passionately
argued, education should be about the making of a
within the comfortable but hopelessly inadequate
good, that is to say, a fully developed, human
categories of liberal and conservative, a Christian
humanism prompts us to an independent analysis
being. And it does so by engaging the student in
of political proposals, judging them in light of a
broad, basic studies that enable us to understand
the whole, the cosmos. A curriculum should be
biblical anthropology.
faithful to the many-faceted nature of reality, from
This kind of perspective, it seems to me, can
sub-atomic particles to the heights of religious
helpfully inform our approach to two policy areas
mysticism. From a Christian perspective, this
that are especially susceptible to the reductionism
makes sense, since God reveals his wisdom and
a Christian should resist: environmental regulation
and stem cell research. It is a mark of our impovlove through the Book of Revelation and the Book
erished politics that one would not expect the
of Nature; faith and human reason both yield
truths that originate with the Author of Truth. As
same person to be concerned about both things,
Ambrose of Milan affirmed, ''Anything true, by no
but this is exactly the kind of dichotomy Christian
matter whom said, is from the Holy Spirit." The
teaching defies.
When approaching environunity of truth lends dignity to the
Everything
about
investigation of all of reality-sacred
mental policy, Christians are singularly able to resist the impulse to
and mundane-as all reality bears the
our Christian
stamp of God's creative love. In the
story prepares us regard natural resources as simply
material to be used at will for our
words of John Henry Newman, "All
to approach the
that is good, all that is true, all that is
comfort and security. Such an attitude
learning process
has implicitly informed much of our
beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it
not
only
with
land-use. In the words of Aldo
great or small, be it perfect or fragwonder, but also
Leopold, founder of the Wilderness
mentary, natural as well as supernatSociety, we have too often used the
ural, moral as well as material, comes
with profound
natural world according to a
from Him."
gratitude.
simplistic formula of economic utility,
Hence, there should be a
which "defines no right or wrong, assigns no obliChristian impulse to offer an expansive, unified
gations, calls for no sacrifice, [and] implies no
curriculum, grounded in the conviction that
change in the current philosophy of values."
approaching life and learning through a dedication
Hence Leopold's plea for a more comprehensive
to the liberal arts illumined by faith provides the
"land ethic" informed by what he calls an "ecologsurest initiation into human wholeness. Cultivating
ical conscience." Christian theology yields vitalthis kind of wholeness, which is to my mind the
indeed, indispensable-resources for the developwork of Christian humanism, runs against the
ment of such a comprehensive ethic and the
reductive impulses so pervasive in our culture-in
formation of such a conscience. Drawing upon the
the academy, politics, medicine, and economics. A
Catholic tradition, in particular, I think that the
Christian humanism consciously resists this reducChurch's understanding of the sacramentality of
tionism and insists on seeing things whole.
creation, the requirements of a just social order,
and the resources of the spiritual life are critical
Christian life and learning: an application
elements in the theoretical and practical enterprise
A student trained in the ways of Christian
of conservation.
humanism would emerge from the university a
For the Christian humanist, the natural world
more whole, integrated person. She would be
is a material resource ordained for human use, but
equipped to engage the world in a distinctive way,
it is more than that. A reflection of God's creativity,
reflective of her deep Christian education. Let me

sl9
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it has the sublime power to inspire contemplation
and praise. Even in its mundane use, however, it is
to be treated in a particular way. Pope John Paul II
calls for a "ministerial dominion" that is respectful
of earth's integrity and rhythms and mindful of the
fact that man does not own, but simply stewards
creation. The practice of stewardship, moreover,
entails a consideration of justice to our fellows; our
use of the world's resources must be defined in
light of the needs of others. This is why the pope
calls the ecological crisis a moral crisis: the
wasteful habits of some have harmed many. In
order to enact environmental policies that both
accord due respect to the natural world and
redound to the global common good, we need to
bring a larger, richer vision to environmental policymaking; we need, in short, a biblical vision of
creation to guide our decisions.
Likewise, a Christian vision is necessary in the
area of biotechnology, a field often governed by a
similarly reductionist impulse. When this is applied
to embryonic stem cell research we see an even
more grievous example of instrumenta1ization than
we find in environmental policy, and so the expansive vision of Christian humanism is especially
needful here. Unlike many policymakers on
Capito] Hill, Christians recognize human life as a

sacred reality, and they refuse to render it raw
material for our use-even for the sake of the
noblest causes. As I see it, a Christian conscience
allows the poetic profundity of the psalms to shape
its vision of the tiniest member of our species,
seeing in the fragile embryo not a reserve of DNA
to be harvested at will, but a human being mysteriously participating in the supernatural destiny of
God's children.
In each of these cases-the one concerning the
environment, the other the embryo-the disposition of the Christian humanist is marked by
humility before that which she did not make and
should not aim to master. Inspired by the richness
of the biblical vision, she attempts to see things
whole and to see them sub specie aeternitatisunder the aspect of eternity. Possessed of such a
perspective, she resists the reductive impulse of our
time and the despair to which it inevitably leads.
Instead, as Berry suggests, she insists that meaning
suffuses the cosmos, and so she exclaims with love
for the world what Edgar so tenderly spoke to
Gloucester, "Thy life's a miracle"!

f

Jeanne Heffernan teaches Political Science at
Pepperdine University and directs the university,s
Washington, D. C. Internship Program.

Prayer
Let me hang in the space
you invent.
By my feet, if need be.
Like the bat
in her surplice of leather,
folded
in expectation.
Suspend me from whimsical rafters
of your grace,
permit me to sound out
the intricate
shapes of your orchard.
Feed me
with your deft fruit.

Linda Mills Woolsey

what we have loved:
memory and the heart of learning
Roger Lundin

I.

OUR GOAL IS TO "REVISIT THE CONNECTION"

between Christianity and liberal learning, then
there can be few better places from which to begin
our journey than the nineteenth century. There we
find Christianity facing bracing challenges of direct
relevance to our own spiritual lives and theological
concerns, and it is also in the final decades of that
century that we witness the emergence of liberal
learning as we now define, practice, and defend it.
What makes this century so vital to our task of
revisiting the connection is the fact that this challenge and this emergence are not coincidental or
unrelated, but intimately tied to one another. In the
form that we know them, liberal learning and the
modern ideal of the humanities were cultivated at
that century's close as a kind of healing balm to
repair the wounds inflicted upon Christian belief
over the course of that century.
In focusing upon questions of history here, I
am in a way going against type. When we gather as
Christian educators to reflect upon the connections
between the Lord to whom we bear witness and
the educational vision we profess, we customarily
speak of themes and ideals rather than of narratives
of the past. Now to be sure, our contemplations
and visions are central to our work as Christian
educators. They set us at a distance from our daily
labors and afford us a refreshing perspective on our
sometimes wearying activities. They are to us what
the climbing of trees is to the "swinger ~ birches"
in Robert Frost's remarkable poem. The speaker in
"Birches" tells us that as a boy he liked to climb
those branches "Toward heaven." And so, he says:
I dream of going back to be.
It's when I'm weary of considerations,
And life is too much like a pathless wood
Where your face burns and tickles with the cobwebs
Broken across it, and one eye is weeping
From a twig's having lashed across it open.
I'd like to get away from earth awhile
And then come back to it and begin over.
10
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The speaker in Frost's poem has his trees to
climb to gain his fresh vantage point, while we have
our Lilly-funded flights to take, rooms to occupy,
and vistas to enjoy so that we may renew our vision
for the work before us. Yet as the speaker of Frost's
poem reminds us, he-and we-must return from
the treetops and make our way back from Malibu.
"May no fate willfully misunderstand me," he
pleads:
And half grant what I wish and snatch me away
Not to return. Earth's the right place for love:
I don't know where it's likely to go better.
Love and memory are my themes today. If earth is
indeed the right place for love, I can think of no
better way of returning to it for our thinking about
"Christianity and liberal learning" than through
the offices of memory and the work of history. In
the account I am about to offer, I am indebted in
particular to James Turner, whose work on the rise
of unbelief and the growth of the humanities in the
nineteenth century provides a framework for my
argument. At the heart of this history, however,
will be nineteenth-century poets, novelists, and
essayists. Each wrote profoundly on memory as
well as love, and each speaks to the matters on our
minds and in our hearts.
memory and modernity
We begin with Wordsworth, who has provided
our title. The passage comes at the end of The
Prelude. Mter having documented everything from
the French Revolution to the development of his
own "poetic mind," Wordsworth links memory,
love, and learning with the poet's calling: "what we
have loved,/ Others will love, and we will teach
them how."
As it stands, this seems a remarkably concise
representation of a Christian understanding of the
art of teaching and the heart of learning. These are
enterprises of cultural memory and transmission.
The present perfect tense-"what we have loved"

Logos philosophy of the Greeks, the incarnational
-speaks of the passing nature of all expenence
theology of John's gospel, and medieval
and implies our need to pass it on.
Catholicism's Aristotelian theology of nature. It
We will teach them, Wordsworth appears to say,
entails the conviction that the universe is saturated
about the objects of our affection, with the goal of
with a worded significance. Ideas and values are
having them share the love we hold. It is not a techlocated in the world and not exclusively in human
nique for having affections, however, that we will
impart; rather, we will teach them to love the proper
consciousness; they inhere in the nature of things
persons, things, and beings. "He lives in justice and
and are not merely ascribed to objects by subjects.
In Charles Taylor's words, in this view of reality
sanctity who is an unprejudiced assessor of the
intrinsic value of things," writes St. Augustine. "He
"the order of things embodies an ontic logos," and
is a man who has an ordinate love: he neither loves
"correct human knowledge and valuation comes
what should not be loved nor fails to love what
from our connecting ourselves rightly to the signifshould be loved." Sinners are not to be loved for
icance things already have."
their own sake, and all women and men are to be
To support his argument, Taylor refers briefly to
"loved for the sake of God, and God should be
the work of Walter Ong, the brilliant Catholic
loved for His own sake." While Wordsworth
literary critic whose book on Peter Ramus examines
grounds teaching in the act of transmitting the past,
the linguistic evidence for the transformation of
he also speaks confidently of
modern conceptions of self,
what is to come in the future:
God, and world. As an example
''He is a man who has an
"what we have loved,/ Others ordinate love: he neither loves
of these changes, Ong cites the
will love." He delivers this as
history
of the words honor and
what should not be loved nor
an assertion that takes on the
praise, which we think of as
fails to love what should be
character of a promise, having
qualities applied to objects by
loved.,
Sinners
are
not
to
be
connected in two lines of
persons, but to Ramus and his
loved for their own sake~ and classical and Christian predepoetry past, present, and future
all women and men are to be cessors, "object[s] somehow
in a narrative of memory and
anticipation.
emanate honor and praise, in
"loved for the sake of God~
This sounds good, but if
and God should be loved for this way performing a kind of
we step back and scan the
personal role." When we praise
His own sake.,
longer passage in which these
God, we respond m a
lines are couched, a somewhat
secondary fashion to the praise
different picture emerges. Wordsworth 1magmes
that flowed from its primary source in God; ours is
his age and nation sinking to "servitude, ignominy,
not a work of creative attribution but one of
and shame." Still he hopes we may yet be
dependent participation. Ong refers to the Merchant
"labourers in a work. .. of redemption." (Samuel
of Venice-"How many things by season season'd
Taylor Coleridge is the other person forming the
are/ To their right praise and true perfection" [V,v,
"we" in these passages.) We will stand as "Prophets
108-9]-and other works to illustrate his conclusion:
of Nature," Wordsworth asserts, and "speak/ A
"For the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century mind,
lasting inspiration." Then follows the "what we
the value in the object and the praise elicited by the
have loved" passage, after which The Prelude
object tend to be viewed as one whole."
moves quickly to its conclusion: We will "Instruct
This train of thought is on a descending trajecthem how the mind of man becomes/ A thousand
tory by the time Wordsworth writes The Prelude. In
times more beautiful than the earth/ On which it
his lifetime, from 1770-185 0-the era of the English
dwells." The mind dwells above the world, for it is
Romantic poets and German philosophical ideal"Of substance and of fabric more divine."
ists-it intersects with a rising belief in the primacy
Written at the dawn of the nineteenth century,
of the mind, consciousness, or imagination.
The Prelude marks a point at which the arcs of two
Wordsworth intended The Prelude to be truly a
radically different intellectual trajectories cross.
prelude to a longer epic he never finished. He did,
The descending line traces the path of a conception
however, complete a "Prospectus" to this work. It
of the cosmos deeply etched in western conscioushas a haunting beauty and makes audacious claims
ness. This view has many sources, including the
on behalf of this mind, which is ''A thousand times

more beautiful than the earth. The "Prospectus"
piles image upon image to affirm that nothingnot "Jehovah-with his thunder," nor his "choir of
shouting angels," nor the pits of hell itself can
"breed such fear and awe/ As fall upon us often
when we look! Into our Minds."
The brief prospectus then turns into a wedding
verse celebrating the union of "the intellect of
Man" and "this goodly universe." In "love and holy
passion" this "great consummation" shall make
nothing less than Paradise "A simple produce of the
common day":
my voice proclaims
How exquisitely the individual Mind
... to the external World
Is fitted:-and how exquisitely, too, ...
The external world is fitted to the Mind;
And the creation.. .
which they with blended might
Accomplish:-this is our high argument.
And this was indeed to be the "high argument" of
many of the greatest English-language writers of the
first half of the nineteenth century-including Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, William Blake, Ralph Waldo
Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau, among others.
We might make the distinction between this
position and the preceding pattern described by
Ong and Taylor in the following manner. Then, the
"value in the object and the praise elicited by" it
were both, in a fashion, dependents of God;
subject and object were equal children of the
divine, not identical twins yet nonetheless bearers
of the same familial DNA. Now, at the dawn of the
nineteenth century the human person as subject is
one thing, the natural world as object, another;
they are exquisitely fitted, like husband and wife,
to each other, and it is their offspring that will
become the restored paradise, the longed-for
kingdom that God has yet failed to bring into
being. As Wordsworth's fellow poet, Robert
Southey wrote of their era, "Old things seemed
passing away, and nothing was dreamt of but the
regeneration of the human race."
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then,
many looked for the end of history as we had known
it since we began wandering east of Eden. The vision
of the new order sprang from the mind of human
beings whose task it was, in Emerson's words, to
effect "the transformation of genius into practical
power." In The Prelude, Wordsworth confesses that
at the height of the French revolution, the earth had
appeared to him as an "inheritance, new-fallen"
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appears to one who comes to make his home in it. He
"moulds it and remoulds,/ And is half pleased with
things that are amiss,/ 'Twill be such joy to see them
disappear." The joy of liberation here is palpable, as
Jehovah, his choir of angels, and the sordid history
over which they have ruled appear about to vanish.
But if Wordsworth's "Mind of Man" was to
triumph, if consciousness was to play ascendant
husband to nature's submissive wife, memory had to
be subdued and chastened. Emerson is a key figure
here. In the 1830s, having traded his Unitarian pulpit
for a lyceum lectern and the sermon for the lecture,
he traced the contours of a cultural life to be established beyond the Christian creeds, the scriptures,
and the Triune God. In a series of dazzling essays, he
sought to obliterate the distinction between God and
human consciousness, for "God incarnates himself in
man, and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of the world." The incarnation is an exercise in
self-development and self-expansion, and God
assumes his new and only residence within: "That
which shows God in me, fortifies me. That which
shows God out of me, makes me a wart and a wen."
For Emerson, no force has a greater power to
"show God out of me" than memory. It makes us
foolishly concerned about the consistency of our
acts and the continuity of our identity; it trains our
minds on the dead letter of the past rather than the
quick spirit of the present; and it imposes on life's
freely flowing forces a pattern our experience
neither seeks nor requires. Emerson's disdain for
memory is visceral and relentless. The problem with
preaching is that it is rooted in tradition and "comes
out of the memory, not out of the soul"; "when we
have new perception," he writes, we are able at last
to discard the "old rubbish" of "memory"; we are
burdened not by our sins but by the "monstrous
corpse of memory" under whose weight we stagger;
and God protects us from our past by drawing
behind us a "screen of purest sky." "You will not
remember," he seems to say, "and you will not
expect....All good ... action[s] come from a spontaneity which forgets ....Life has no memory."
love, memory, and the rise of liberal learning
Not surprisingly, this assault on memory 1s
accompanied by a sharp critique of the art of
teaching and the work of the American college. As
records of past experiences, Emerson writes, books
"are for nothing but to inspire." They are for the
"scholar's idle times," because when he or she can

"read God directly, the hour is too precious to be
wasted in other men's transcripts of their readings." The truth, he told the Harvard Divinity
School students in 1838, "cannot be received at
second hand," for "truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from
another soul." The person thus provoked is "the
word made flesh, born to shed healing to the
nations," and he or she is ready to begin "tossing
the laws, the books, idolatries, and customs out of
the window." Having been a lackluster student at
Harvard, Emerson saw little of value in the cloistered life of higher education. After all, "life is our
dictionary," he declared. "Colleges and books only
copy the language which the field and the workyard made."
In the seventh decade of the nineteenth
century, that language of the American field and
workyard acquired a bloody coloring and took on
violent resonances. It is here that our story turns,
for as Andrew Delbanco has written, "the Civil
War was the great divide between a culture of faith
and a culture of doubt. . . . Before the war,
Americans spoke of providence. After it, they
spoke of luck." For many in the war's aftermath,
both the long-standing orthodoxies of Christianity
and the more recently minted pieties of the
Romantic and Transcendental faiths seemed brittle
and hollow. Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example,
survived his wounds from the bloody battle of the
Wilderness in the spring of 1864 but never recovered from the spiritual shocks of those dreadful
years. He went on to a distinguished career as a
Supreme Court justice, but "he never forgot what
he lost. "He told me," [Albert] Einstein reported,
"that 'after the Civil War the world never seemed
quite right again."'
Ruled by a God of Battles so ruthless, efficient,
and indifferent that he had no name but that of
"force," the Civil War particularly confirmed what
some writers and thinkers of the day were already
beginning to fear generally. For these poets, novelists, and philosophers, the early nineteenth century
joys of liberation were being transformed into the
terrors of abandonment. This is the point of the
dreadful yet gleeful passage on the death of God in
Friedrich Nietzsche's The Gay Science-"We have
killed him-you and I. All of us are his
murderers"-as it is, I believe, one of the reasons
for the fascination of the nineteenth-century
American and English novel with the figure of the

orphan. Take the orphans out of the novels of
Dickens, the Bronte sisters, and George Eliot, and
what do you have left? What would Great
Expectations be if Pip had parents? What is The
Scarlet Letter but the story of a daughter's search
to find the father who has abandoned her? Who is
Huckleberry Finn if not another orphan drifting
down the lazy river of aimless American time?
As the nineteenth century moved into its final
decades, then, mind and nature appeared to be in
the final stages of a divorce brought on by irreconcilable differences, and their abandoned children
were the orphans of a brave new world, a strangely
different age. In Moby-Dick, written a decade
before the Civil War, Herman Melville's Captain
Ahab asks about this abandonment: "Where lies
the final harbor, whence we unmoor no more? ...
Where is the foundling's father hidden? Our souls
are like those orphans whose unwedded mothers
die in bearing them: the secret of our paternity lies
in their grave, and we must there to learn it." Or as
Emily Dickinson was to write in 1882-the same
year Nietzsche's The Gay Science was published:
Those-dying then,
Knew where they wentThey went to God's Right HandThat Hand it amputated now
And God cannot be foundThe abdication of Belief
Makes the Behavior smallBetter an ignis fatuus
Than no illume at allFor Melville and Dickinson, the awareness of loss
and the terror of abandonment came with a corresponding quest to revivify memory. It was to them
no longer a corpse threatening to crush the fresh
identity of a people freed from the clutches of
history. Instead, memory became the resonant
core, the vital body of that identity. Melville's
wrenching account of slavery, race, and the ironies
of identity, Benito Cereno, concludes with the
forward-looking American Amasa Delano admonishing the broken-hearted Cereno: "But the past is
passed; why moralize upon it? Forget it." The sun
has forgotten it, "and the blue sea, and the blue
sky; these have turned over new leaves." They have
done so, Benito Cereno "dejectedly replied,"
"because they have no memory; because they are
not human."
Thus, as the Wordsworthian and Emersonian
faith in the transforming force of consciousness

waned, the passion for memory as a resurrection
In that half-century, a new congeries of subjects,
power waxed more strongly. "I cannot tell how
known as the humanities, came into being and
Eternity seems. It sweeps around me like a sea,"
quickly displaced the Greek and Latin centered
Emily Dickinson wrote to her cousins only days
curriculum that had governed the liberal arts for
centuries.
after her mother had died in late 1882. Yet "thank
you for remembering me. Remembrance-mighty
This "rise of the humanities was intimately
word. 'Thou gavest it to me from the foundation of
linked to embarrassments consequent upon secularization," Turner claims. Those embarrassments
the world."' Several weeks later, she wrote, again in
reference to her mother's death: "Memory is a
had to do with the weakening of what the late
nineteenth-century Princeton physicist Joseph
strange Bell-Jubilee, and Knell." It was "Jubilee"
because it brought the dead to life and lodged them
Henry spoke of as that belief which should
securely in the mansion of the mind. "My Hazel
animate all research and teaching in the modern
university: "all the phenomena of the external
Eye/ Has periods of shutting-/ But no lid has
Memory," Dickinson claimed, for "Memory like
universe, and perhaps all those of the spiritual,
Melodyj Is pink eternally-." Yet at the same time,
[may be] reduced to the operation of a single and
memory also sounds the death "Knell," tolling the
simple law of the Divine will." According to
Turner, this assumption was undermined by the
loss of ones she had loved. "Remorse-is
Memory-awake," and the mind that raises the
passing of the moral philosophy that had unified
dead must also acknowledge that "The Grave-was
college curricula from the Revolution to the Civil
finished-but the Spade/ Remained in Memory-."
War; by the increasingly specialized work of
researchers who had neither the need nor the
For Dickinson, memory's power was without equal
as a human capacity, and life
desire "to invoke the creator of
The doctrine of the Trinity,
any larger matrix of knowlwithout memory was unthinkby contrast, reminds us that edge"; by the influence of gradable. "Dear friend," she wrote
to a neighbor in 1879, "I think
uate training in Germany where
persons are essentially in
Heaven will not be as good as relation. Our relations aren't ties between Christianity and
higher learning "had frayed if
earth, unless it bring with that
an "add on," they're at the
sweet power to remember,
not snapped"; by the small,
core of who we are. To the
which is the Staple of Heavengrowing cadre of agnostics who
extent
that
this
isn't
true
for
here. How can we thank each
appeared in universities after
of
human
persons,
it's
a
sign
the Civil War; and, finally, by
other, when omnipotent?"
our
failure
to
be
persons
in
It is hardly a coincidence
the methodological consethe fullest sense, after the
quences of Darwin and his
that in the same decades during
model of the divine persons. system's "shaking of episternawhich Melville and Dickinson
were meditating on memory
logical certainty."
and the loss of God-from the 1850s through the
With a few exceptions, late nineteenth-century
American universities and colleges moved with
1880s-the modern ideal of liberal learning was
what Turner terms "a buoyant zeal to bring
taking form and then taking hold of American
Christian learning up to date" and subdue "the
higher education. In a series of compelling books,
threat of disciplinary specialization and of intellecJames Turner has written extensively about this
subject for the past twenty years-first in his path
tual secularization more broadly." As they fought
breaking Without God, Without Creed: The Origins
this good fight, educators of that era deployed the
humanities as the main weapon in their arsenal,
of Unbelief in America, then in his biography of
hoping through the offices of liberal arts education
Charles Eliot Norton, and most recently in The
to restore coherence to an increasingly fragmented
Sacred and the Secular University, jointly-authored
array of disciplines and to sustain the religious
with Jon Roberts.
"Development may be forecast; revolution
character of learning, even as their schools and
curricula shed their allegiances to any particular
cannot," Turner writes in the opening sentence of
Christian confession, authority, or creed. This indifhis section of this latter book. No one could have
ference to historic Christianity should not surprise
predicted in 1850 the dramatic new "shapes into
us, for the most vocal proponents of the humanities
which academic knowledge would shift by 1900."
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and the ideal of liberal learning-such as Charles
Eliot Norton on this side of the Atlantic, and
Matthew Arnold across the sea-were Protestants
who were not necessarily Christians. And within a
matter of years their vision was to make the
American and British university a safe haven for
what George Marsden has memorably phrased
"liberal Protestantism without Protestantism."
At mid-century, however, others had set out
not just to recover the ethos of a remembered past
but to recuperate the living faith that had once
animated its long history. For some, like John
Henry Newman and Orestes Brownson, this meant
a return to the Catholic church from which their
ancestors had separated centuries before. Others
like John W. Nevin and Charles Hodge, were, as
Mark Noll felicitously puts it, "far less convinced
that the deliverances of consciousness did as much
for theological formation as their American counterparts claimed." Members of this group sought to
counter the vapidities of liberalism through a
renewal of creedal Protestantism.
Yet in the main, the scholars and leaders who
shaped the American revival of liberal learning in
the late nineteenth century had little desire to
resist the shift in knowledge that Walter Ong and
Charles Taylor have outlined for us. To most of
these hesitantly Christian humanists, the world
was a domain of objects without qualities faced by
an array of human subjects who invented and
ascribed to these objects what values they could.
In most cases, those educators, whom Taylor calls
"our Victorian contemporaries," longed to
believe that an increasingly nebulous and ineffable mind of God held these objects and subjects
together within a single purpose, a single law, a
single destiny.
Nevertheless, as Taylor points out, the
Victorian humanists also found it ever more difficult to hold together the "split-screen vision of
nature" they bequeathed to us. On one side of the
screen we view the vast universe of modern science,
"huge and in some ways baffling . . . indifferent to
us and strangely other, though full of unexpected
beauty and inspiring awe." On the other side we
scan what Taylor calls our "inexhaustible inner
domain"; from it flows the values that give our life
meaning and the visions that drive us to goals
beyond the needs of the moment. How the inner
world is to relate to the outer one is, in Taylor's
words, "deeply problematical." This makes our

"cultural predicament utterly different from what
existed before the eighteenth century, where the
scientific explanation of the natural order was [still]
closely aligned with its moral meaning....For us,
the two have drifted apart, and it is not clear how
we can hope to relate them."
re-membering love: the mysteries of the Incarnation
How the Catholic and Protestant institutions
that make up the Lilly Fellows network have gone
about the task of "relating" these disparate pictures
for the past century is another story, and in general
it is a narrative with clearer visions and brighter
prospects than Charles Taylor may have considered
possible. But it is by any standard a story with
many diverse and distinctive strands. No single
Christian tradition, let alone a solitary Christian
observer, could possibly comprehend the whole on
this question. We are Baptists and Catholics,
Lutherans and Mennonites, Methodists and
Christian Reformed, members of the Churches of
Christ and adherents to the free church and independent church traditions. If Tertullian puzzled
over what Athens had to do with Jerusalem, it
perhaps should not surprise us that we struggle at
times to determine precisely what Dordt has to do
with Trinityn Mennonite, or Wheaton with
Wittenberg, for that matter.
So, rather than attempt a quick synthesis of the
best elements of our many different traditions of
higher education, I want to round off these
remarks with a brief meditation on something we
all share, in which memory, love, and learning
come together in extraordinary ways. I refer to the
sacrament that has many names-the Lord's
Supper, the Eucharist, or Holy Communion-but
one object, one subject, and one Lord.
And here I will call again on the poets. Near
the end of his life, W. H. Auden wrote of what he
called "the significance of the Mass." ''As biological
organisms," he observed, "we must all, irrespective
of sex, age, intelligence, character, creed, assimilate
other lives in order to live." And in his words, "as
conscious beings, the same holds true [for us] on
the intellectual level: all learning is assimilation."
Because we are children of God who are made in
God's image, Auden concludes, "we are required in
turn voluntarily to surrender ourselves to being
assimilated by our neighbors according to their
needs. The slogan of Hell: Eat or be eaten. The
slogan of Heaven: Eat and be eaten."

This idea of "surrendering ourselves to being
assimilated by our neighbors according to their
needs" has always struck me as a wise and deft definition of teaching. We give ourselves up in the
service of the texts, formulas, theories, scores, and
narratives that have nourished us, and, in turn, we
surrender ourselves to our students so that they
may make use of us according to their needs. Yet at
the same time, is it not often the case that we as
teachers assimilate some remarkable things from
our students? This was the case for me in my first
year of college teaching. We had gotten to
Dickinson, and as I worked my way through the
material somewhat stiffly, we came to a poem that
had me stumped. It begins:
A Clover's simple Fame
Remembered of the Cow
Is sweeter than enameled Realms
of notoriety! uttered something unmemorable about the idea of
memory, but what one student said I have never
forgotten. He brought us back to the imagery of
the poem and implored us to think simply of how
a cow turns clover into milk. He urged us to think
of "remembered" not just in the sense of "being
brought back to mind," but of something being "remembered" in the sense of its having been broken,
its having died, and its having been transformed.
It was the brokenness of Jesus the Son that
drew Dickinson to him, even as she shunned the
sovereign serenity of God the Father. Late in life
she wrote to a neighbor that "when Jesus tells
about his Father, we distrust him," just as "when he
shows us his Home, we turn away, but when he
confides to us that he is 'acquainted with Grief,' we
listen, for that also is an Acquaintance of our own."
As one of her several powerful and moving poems
about Christ phrases it, his "acquaintance" with
death "justifies Him" and makes him that "Tender
Pioneer" who leads and guides us every step of the
often difficult human way. Here in the life and
death of this one "acquainted with Grief,"
Dickinson the subject found an object whose qualities she could praise, honor, love, and grasp. As
she wrote to a friend as they both grieved the death
of a man they honored and loved, "the crucifix
requires no glove."
In writing about the tensions marking modernity, between love and knowledge, between
memory and hope, Charles Taylor notes,
''Augustine holds that in relation to God, love has
16,17
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to precede knowledge. With the right direction of
love, things become evident which are hidden
otherwise." As we consider the connections
between Christianity and liberal learning, are we
not asking how our love of God and God's world
might guide both our pursuit of knowledge and our
teaching and thereby make evident so many things
otherwise hidden?
As Christian scholars and teachers, we most
effectively uncover and disclose those truths by
remembering in our thoughts as Christian scholars
and re-membering through our deeds as
worshipers in the body of Christ that "the Word
became flesh and lived among us." In the incarnation, mind and body, God and man, subject and
object come together as one through the sacrificial
freedom of a creative, long-suffering God. In the
light shed by the incarnation, we can see new ways
of looking at ourselves as subjects, as well as fresh
ways of perceiving the loveliness of objects, even
those objects we once found most unlovely.
Only a month after her mother died, Emily
Dickinson confessed to a friend, "we were never
intimate Mother and Children while she was our
Mother-but Mines in the same Ground meet by
tunneling and when she became our Child, the
Affection came." As we strive to teach others to
love what we have loved, we do well to remember
that the connections between Christ and the life of
the mind may be more readily discovered in Emily
Dickinson's tunnels than glimpsed from Robert
Frost's treetops. As he dreamed of heaven and
thought of his own art at his life's close, William
Butler Yeats concluded, "I must lie down where all
the ladders start/ In the foul rag and bone shop of
the heart." Or as one of his own earlier poems had
asserted, "Love has pitched his mansion in/ The
place of excrement;/ For nothing can be sole or
whole/ That has not been rent." We begin where
our own affection, our own love came-with our
memory of that child who became a man and
whose body was rent, broken out of love, first, so
that it might be re-membered by us and, then, so
that we might live with the hope of that day when
God will re-member us wholly, body, mind, and
soul, for eternity. That is a love worth teaching.
That is a truth worth remembering. f
Roger Lundin is Blanchard Professor of English at
Wheaton College, Illinois, and author most recently
of Emily Dickinson and the Art of Belief.

dancing with death:
reclaiming martyrdom in an era of suicide bombers
Jonathan E. Brockopp

MARTYRDOM

~

ONE OF THOSE WORDS THAT

we use to define ourselves, to set ourselves apart
from what we are not. We don't particularly like
martyrs among us, and when someone denies themselves the pleasure of the last remaining brownie
our response often is: Oh, don't be such a martyr.
Of course, the implication is that we are not
martyrs. Given half a chance, we'd grab that
brownie and run with it. Carpe diem! Seize the
profits, seize the five-figure bonus, seize the oil
under the Iraqi desert. We are not martyrs, we are
fighters. And it is instructive to note that we have
never described as martyrs the emergency response
teams in New York City who gave up their lives.
Nor, so far as I know, were the 45 passengers on
United Airlines flight 93 ever described as martyrs,
because that's just too suspect of a word. They were
heroes. Martyrdom, then, is a psychological state,
perhaps even a neurosis like co-dependence.
Such martyrs as we remember in Christianity
seem to have lived in the distant past. They were
brave souls who gave up their lives in the face of
persecution. We might think of Christians in
ancient Rome, their nobility enhanced by the figure
of Russell Crowe cutting across the movie screen in
Gladiator. Or, we might think back to the early
apostles-Stephen, Peter, Paul, and others who
died for their faith. We might even remember that
the religious freedom we enjoy in this country is in
part due to the Pilgrims, the Shakers, and the
Quakers, all of whom fled persecution in Europe.
In this case, martyrdom is a response to religious or
political persecution, and in our modern societies,
it is utterly a thing of the past.
There is, however, a third kind of martyrdom,
one that is far more contested, and one that
certainly does not describe us. In fact, it is a curious
thing that we simultaneously call them terrorists,
murderers, and suicide bombers while also recognizing that they term themselves martyrs. And so,
with gruesome fascination at the twistedness of the

human mind, we read about their prayers to their
God, their promises of paradise, and their seven
layers of underwear to protect their genitals from
the blast so that later in heaven they can enjoy the
seventy-seven eternal virgins. We think this third
kind of martyrdom is a fraud, an example of how
religion brainwashes adherents into doing most
anything with promises of eternal renown and licit
sexual pleasure.
Whatever good name martyrdom once might
have had, it seems it cannot have it anymore. In our
pragmatic and multi-cultural world, this seems to
be an aspect of religion we are better off without.
But certain aspects of martyrdom are worth our
while to reclaim. We should not dismiss it as an
outdated or dangerous mode of thinking, but
should find the good in it. In so doing, we might
find a useful mode of Christian action to help fix
our broken world. More importantly, we make
significant progress in learning to love our enemies,
especially those who attack us and our friends.
If you are reading carefully, you will note that I
just made a shift, and no small one. I am suggesting
a connection between knowledge and action, a
necessary connection between what we know and
what we choose to do about it. This may seem
rather strange given the fact that scholars are
supposed to sit in dusty libraries and publish books
of great meaning that no one can quite understand.
As someone who specializes in Arabic manuscripts
written by ninth-century scholars of Islamic law in
the nascent Maliki tradition, I am certainly in love
with the arcane worlds of the past. But I learned as
a student at Valparaiso University that Christian
higher learning is necessarily bound to social action,
and is anything but dispassionate.
Perhaps the single most influential course I took
at Valpo was on Jewish-Christian dialogue, looking
at the first five books of the Bible from the perspective of these two religious traditions. I still have
some of the books from that course and remember

some of the content. But what remains most clearly
in my mind was the dynamic between the two
professors of the course. The first, Rabbi Joseph
Edelheit, was a powerful, opinionated figure who
took it as his mission to shake students out of their
complacency and change the way we looked at the
world. I had presumed Judaism to be a relic, a religion that was superseded by Christianity. Of course,
I had a vague notion that there were Jews in Israel
and in New York City, but I was frankly surprised to
find out that there were Jews in Northern Indiana.
In contrast to Rabbi Edelheit was the quiet but
no less formidable presence of Walter Rast. I knew
that Walt Rast was a famous archeologist, and I
thought his work on Bronze-age sites on the
Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea was terribly
romantic. He threw around Greek and Hebrew
terms as if they were English, and Edelheit treated
him and his knowledge of the texts with the
utmost respect.
The whole course seemed sort of transgressive.
Edelheit said things I had never heard before, for
example, that Christians had completely misinterpreted the Genesis story, that it was not about the
"fall" and original sin but about the intimate relationship God established with his people. For his
part, Rast would not contradict Edelheit. He
acknowledged Edelheit's claims and proceeded to
explain how Christians see the workings of the
Messiah in the Genesis story. Only very slowly did
I come to realize that Rast's ability to listen,
consider, and respond creatively arose from the
great strength of his convictions. Edelheit, as well,
responded not with defensiveness but with
curiosity, asking questions about the Messianic
tradition in Christianity that allowed Rast to
explain, in great detail, points of convergence and
difference in the two religions.
Their example taught me that religious
dialogue is not about which side has the truth but
about working together on common goals. In that
class we took apart the two Genesis narratives,
learned about the four strands of authorship in the
Torah, and learned how the Rabbis played with the
multiple meanings of the Hebrew words.
According to Edelheit and Rast, good will and
common interests were not sufficient. For them,
religious dialogue is founded on a common future;
conversion is utterly dismissed as a goal. The point
must be to make the other a better Christian, a
better Jew.
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This is a radical claim, and I am still working
out its implications. In part, it is a rejection of the
sort of scholarship one sees in the first translations
of the Qur'an into English. Such a translation
appeared in 1649 with the following note "to the
Christian reader":
There being so many Sects and Heresies banded
together against the Truth, finding that of
Mahomet wanting to the Muster, I thought good
to bring it to their Colours, that so viewing thine
enemies in their full body, thou maist the better
prepare to encounter, and I hope overcome them.
... though [the Qur'an] hath been a poyson, that
hath infected a very great, but most unsound part
of the Universe, it may prove an Antidote, to
confirm thee in the health of Christianity.

In the seventeenth century, scholars studied
other religions to find their weaknesses and logical
inconsistencies to prepare missionaries for their
work. That this should no longer be the goal of our
inquiry is quite reasonable, and it fits the comfortable notion of scholarship as an objective, impartial
activity, one quite removed from the politics of the
everyday world. At the same time, the goal of
developing a greater appreciation for the things
that make our religion unique is laudable, so too an
awareness of the extensive heritage common to the
three great monotheisms.
But the claim that inter-religious dialogue is
about faithfulness suggests that the goal of dialogue
is not disengagement, but engagement, not merely
recognition of a common heritage, but of a
common future. Edelheit and Rast were suggesting
that people of faith must question the doctrines
found in every universal religious tradition that
envision a world where other religions have disappeared. That these beliefs ever existed in
Christianity was hard for me to imagine, emotionally even more than intellectually. I am still stirred
by certain biblical passages:
Therefore God exalted him to the highest place
and gave him the name that is above every
name, that at the name of Jesus every knee
should bow, in heaven and on earth and under
the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus
Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.
(Philippians 2:9-11)

When I think of the end of days, I imagine
everyone bowing voluntarily, out of some inner
revelation. I never thought that such bowing would
be done under compulsion. But others in Christian
history have thought just that, and we have perpetrated more than our share of forced conversions

and pogroms. Doctrines of universal superiority
get in the way of honest dialogue; from the start
they make it impossible to see the dialogue
partner-Jew, Muslim, or Buddhist-as fully equal.
Learning about other religious traditions, then, is a
necessary prerequisite to any dialogue. The more
one learns, the more study becomes an act of
reconciliation-atoning for the crusades, the inquisitions, and the holocausts of past ages-by
genuinely valuing the other.

~N,

IT WAS NOT SO MUCH THE CONTENT OF

that one course but the simple example of the
teachers that reinforced this lesson for me. The
tremendous respect that each accorded the other,
the time they took to clarify and respond to our
naive questions, the fact that both men could
undertake this sort of inquiry and remain
unmoved in their own faith commitments-all this
represented an ideal of the academic study of religion. I don't know that they would recognize
themselves in this, but over the course of the years
I have developed rules of interpretation based in
part on their example.
The first requirement is natural for Christians:
a sense of humility. We are limited creatures and
cannot possibly know anything except in partial
and incomplete ways. Second, we should be as
clear as possible about our political and religious
commitments, because these will affect what we see
and how we interpret it. Third, and perhaps most
important, we must engage others with the same
seriousness and respect that we would expect from
them. Finally, we must be prepared to change our
opinions.
Each of these rules is controversial in its own
way, and not everyone will want to accede to all of
them. But I believe some version of each is essential for effective dialogue. The first claim presumes
that we alone cannot determine what we can know.
For example, I might be convinced that I know my
name in a full and complete way, yet that claim
holds only insofar as my name is mine. In fact, it
does not belong to me alone; it is given to me and
invoked by countless others, my parents, son,
students, and colleagues, to name a few. Each of
these persons has a claim on my name, and their
definitions of my name exist alongside and in
conversation with mine. No one possesses
complete knowledge of my name, save perhaps

God alone. Similarly, as a Christian I do not possess
the sole meaning of the Genesis story-others also
have a claim to the truth of that tale. This rule does
not describe nihilism or cultural relativism, but
something much more productive: I cannot understand the meaning of my name or of my interpretation of Genesis until I place my comprehension
within the context of others.
The second and third rules follow from the
first and probably seem reasonable to most. But the
fourth rule needs elaboration-after all, just how
far should one be prepared to change? My answer:
a great deal. But by change I mean allowing our
own opinions to develop and adjust to the claims
of others, not rejecting or renouncing our own
convictions. Despite my study of other religions, I
remain a Christian. But over the years my faith has
become both simpler and more complex. Simpler
in that I realize just how little I am in control of my
faith, and more complex in continually engaging
with Christian diversity in past and present.
Taking these rules into the realm of JewishChristian dialogue is one thing. Can they also be
applied to the study of Islam? After all, we have
incorporated Judaism into American culture in
numerous ways: Menorahs are now a common
sight and even Wisconsin has a Jewish senator. We
regularly speak of our Judeo-Christian heritage, and
in 1998 the ELCA developed explicit guidelines for
demonstrating "love and respect for the Jewish
people." But when I was an undergraduate, the
Munich Olympics of 1972 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 made Islam another story until I
met some Muslim students on campus looking for a
place to pray. I had some long discussions with the
Dean of the Chapel about why the Chapel of the
Resurrection should, or should not, be used for this
activity. Engaging Muslims in their religious convictions-and not only their political agendasbrought back lessons from the comparative religions course. When I entered graduate school three
years later, I decided to focus on Islam, not Judaism.

BUT TH~
IF

EXPLAINS MY INffiAL JNfRJGUE WITH

Islam, it does not explain my pursuits through long
years of graduate study, nor my continued commitment to the scholarly study of Islam. Islam is
harder for Christians to engage than Judaism.
There is not only the current political situation, but
also a structural contrast that is problematic. As

Christians, we are dependent upon Judaism; we
share many of the great narratives that define our
traditions. Jesus, Peter, Paul, and all the other disciples were Jews. But Christians have no category for
Muhammad, except, perhaps, that of false prophet.
We need no knowledge of his story for our faith to
be complete, yet he and his followers claim the
same heritage, prophets, and stories that we claim.
Christian engagement with Islam is the reverse of
Chritian engagement with Judaism. Islam has
appropriated our story in the same way that we
have appropriated the Hebrew Bible. Politically, we
no longer feel threatened by Judaism. But we do
feel that Islam threatens us, especially with the
specter of the martyr we might meet on any plane,
at any bus stop.
martyrdom in Islam
Despite the Hollywood caricature of the
crazed Muslim terrorist ready to kill himself for
God, martyrdom does not have a lengthy history in
Islam. Martyrdom cannot exist without persecution, and for the vast majority of its existence,
Islam has been the dominant tradition in its world.
One exception to that dominance was the earliest
parts of Muhammad's career. Islam began as a
small group, committed to a more just society
based on the worship of the One God. During the
Prophet's lifetime, the early Muslim community
was attacked by surrounding tribes, especially the
Quraysh, and many Muslims lost their lives.
Sumayya bint Kubbat is the first martyr in Islam;
her master tried to force the convert to leave her
new faith and she died when he stabbed her with a
spear. Others were tortured or killed for their
convictions, and even the life of the Prophet was
threatened. One of the earliest sources gives us the
following account:
The Quraysh (tribe] showed their enmity to all
those who followed the apostle; every clan. . .
attacked them, imprisoning them, and beating
them, allowing them no food or drink, and
exposing them to the burning heat of Mecca, so as
to seduce them from their religion. Some gave way
under pressure of persecution, and others resisted
them, being protected by God. Bilal. . .was a
faithful Muslim, pure of heart... (His master] used
to bring him out at the hottest part of the day,
throw him on his back in the open valley and have
a great rock put on his chest; then he would say to
him, 'You will stay here till you die or deny
Muhammad and worship Al-Lat and al-'Uzza (two
of the Meccan goddesses] .' [Bilal] used to say while
he was enduring this, 'One, one!'
20
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By saying "One!" of course, Bilal was declaring his
commitment to the monotheistic creed. Eventually,
the early community was able to defend itself in a
series of skirmishes in which dozens of men and
women-died in battle. The Muslims emerged
victorious, and the tradition counts these individuals among its greatest martyrs.
Because of their acts of self-sacrifice, martyrs
in Islam are understood to have direct access to
heaven, to be among God's elect. Stories abound of
early Muslims throwing themselves into battle with
the hope of dying "in God's path." The Prophet is
said to have wished for three lives so he could lose
each of them fighting for the faith. Another story
from these early battles concerns a soldier taking a
break in the midst of fighting and suddenly
throwing down his dates, saying: ·~ I so eager for
the good things of this world that I should sit here
and finish these morsels in my hand?" He then
grabbed his sword and raced back to the front,
eventually losing his life.
With these words, the soldier was repeating a
familiar refrain in the Qur'an: the good to be
found in this world is mere chance compared to the
good things which God has prepared in the world
to come. The Arabic word for martyr, shahid
means one who witnesses an event. These early
martyrs bore witness to the truth of the new religion, risking their own death in the process. Two
cases from the classical literature demonstrate just
how fine the line is between seeking God's reward
as a martyr in battle and seeking death. In the first,
~ir b. Sinan accidentally slays himself while
beating an enemy with the broad side of his sword.
The story says that the people of Medina began to
lament, because they assumed ~ir's actions
would be considered suicide:
The people said: "his good deeds have gone to
waste : he killed himself!" But I said : "0 Prophet
of God, they claim that 'Amir's good deeds have
gone to waste" and he responded: "The one who
says this lies; 'Amir will receive two rewards,
since he died a martyr."

Though ~ir actively caused his own death, he did
so unintentionally. His purpose was only to engage
an enemy soldier. In the second case, a Muslim also
actively causes his own death with his sword, but
different intentions lead to different consequences.
Both men in these examples died by their own
hand, and both fought in jihad, or religiously sanctioned war. Both appeared to intend the taking of
their own lives, but in the first case, the Prophet,

seek to undertake the hardships of the pilgrimage
due to his knowledge of the unseen, discovered
to Mecca at the end of their lives in hopes of dying
'Amir's real intent. So the distinction between these
examples remains one of inscrutable intentions.
in a state of grace. Such "martyrs of love" are said
also to gain direct entrance into paradise. By the
Intentions are vital for any tradition wanting to
distinguish between martyrdom and suicide. Like
ninth century even legal scholars were being
described as warriors.
Christianity and Judaism, Islam strongly forbids
suicide, seeing it as an encroachment on God's role as
author of life and death. Committing suicide, even in
the face of impending death, is the antithesis of faith,
TRADITION TRANSFORMED A POWERFUL
since it cuts off the possibility that God will bring
concept that had lost its original utility. Elements
about a miracle. Both the martyr and the suicide may
considered essential it kept-the interests of the
die in the end, but the martyr does not need to die in
community over the individual, the beauty of paraorder to be effective. Consider, for example, Daniel in
dise over the "chance goods" of this world. Other
the Lion's den-the point of entering this deadly situelements were discarded, even categories like
ation was to glorify God, not to die.
mortal peril that we might consider essential to
Just as most Sunday school children can tell the
martyrdom. Thus, martyrdom continued to play an
story of Daniel, the Islamic tradition remembers its
important role in Islam even when persecution
martyrs in great detail. By the second Islamic
disappeared. Like the martyr, the Sufi rejects the
century (around 700 C.E.), tales of
material value of life, risking not a
Like Christianity and real death, but a social death in
the early battles of the Prophet had
Judaism, Islam
already become an expected part of
the process of pursuing the path
any cultural event, whether in the
of God's love. This newer form of
strongly forbids
street or in front of the sultan. After
suicide, seeing it as an martyrdom became quite popular
the Islamic empire's rapid spread
in the medieval period, and even
encroachment
on
across the continents of Mrica and
today scholars and Sufis are
God,s role as author
Europe, persecution diminished,
thought to gain a heavenly reward
of life and death.
and with it the chances for
for their efforts. In times of
martyrdom. The classic jihad, the
particular crisis-the Crusades,
defensive struggle of a small Muslim minority
the Mongol invasion, European colonization-the
against overwhelming odds, no longer occurred,
old concept of martyrdom was still available. It is
and traditions spread to change the nature of both
latent in the tradition, ready to be exploited by
jihad and martyrdom.
political leaders. Hasan al-Banna', the modern
A large, stable empire had little need for heroic
idealogue of the Muslim brotherhood, called on his
sacrifices, and about this time it was conveniently
fellow Egyptians to fight the neo-colonialist regime
remembered that jihad's meanings addressed more
in the 1950s. In the following quotation, he seems
than warfare. In fact, the root meaning of jihad is
to blur the line between martyrdom and suicide,
struggle, and a distinction between "lesser
between aiming for heavenly reward and aiming
struggle" and "greater struggle" was thought to go
for death:
Brothers! God gives the umma that is skilled in the
back to the Prophet himself. Here, warfare is
practice of death and that knows how to die a
defined as the "lesser jihad" and the "greater jihad"
noble
death, an exalted life in this world and
was the struggle against one's own evil inclinations.
eternal felicity in the next. What is the fantasy that
This notion was so preval.ent that the greater jihad
has reduced us to loving this world and hating
had greater martyrs, like the Sufis and ascetics who
death? If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed and
gave away all that they had, devoting their lives to
yearn for death, life shall be given to you. Know,
seeking God. A famous example of a "martyr of
then, that death is inevitable, and that it can only
love" is the Muslim mystic al-Hallaj. He was persehappen once. If you suffer it in the way of God, it
cuted for his beliefs but was so strong in his convicwill profit you in this world and bring you reward
tion that he would be admitted into God's presence
in the next. (Five tracts of Hasan Al-Banna')
that he is reported to have been singing "kill me, 0
Al-Banna's distinction between the good of this
my friends, for in my death is my life!" as he was
world and the good of the world to come is a
taken off to the gallows. Similarly, Muslims still
familiar part of martyrdom literature. But his

L.

exhortation to "yearn for death" pushes the
boundaries of intention mentioned above. If you
yearn for death, is your intent really to glorify
God? By playing with this boundary, al-Banna'
opens up the possibility for suicide missions to be
considered acts of martyrdom.
In 1978, just before the revolution in Iran,
Ayatollah Khomeini also invoked the imagery of
martyrdom to call for similar acts of self-sacrifice by
the Iranian people. In the following passage,
Khomeini refers to the Prophet's own grandson,
Husayn, who is known as the Lord of the Martyrs
in the Shi'i tradition. Muharram, the month in
which Husayn was killed, is still marked throughout
the Shi'i world with processions of mourning.
With the approach of Muharram, we are about to
begin the month of epic heroism and self-sacrifice-the month in which blood triumphed over
the sword, the month in which truth condemned
falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of
disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and
satanic governments; the month that has taught
successive generations throughout history the
path of victory over the bayonet; the month that
proves the superpowers may be defeated by the
word of truth; the month in which the leader of
the Muslims taught us how to struggle against all
the tyrants of history, showed us how the clenched
fists of those who seek freedom, desire independence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over
tanks, machine guns, and the armies of Satan, how
the word of truth may obliterate falsehood.
Khomeini's language may be chilling to those
of us who recall that his "armies of Satan" are in
fact our own; the Shah of Iran was, after Israel, our
greatest ally in the region. We must also recognize
that some of the responsibility for the suffering of
the Iranian people prior to 1978 was due to our
support for an unjust and oppressive regime for
strategic reasons. But also notice how the old
conception of martyrdom in Islam still remains
viable and is used by these radical leaders to affect
social change in the face of persecution.
dancing with death
It is, perhaps, enough to find a context for
modern acts of martyrdom in Islam, to distinguish
the greater jihad from the lesser and to see martyrs
of warfare in the context of martyrs of love. We are
still too close to the horror of September 11, 2001,
to do much more than read the letter left behind by
Muhammad Atta and perceive him as a radical
extremist. Indeed, if we can read that letter and
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still see Muslims as good, faithful people, then we
have done much to imagine a common future of
peaceful relations between Muslim and Christian.
But some forty years ago, in his book, Islam
Observed, Clifford Geertz wisely wrote that the
comparative study of religion "can be looked at as
but a circuitous, even devious, approach to a
rational analysis of our own situation, an evaluation of our own religious traditions while seeming
to evaluate only those of exotic others."
In other words, our reflections on martyrdom
and on Islam must necessarily lead to reflections on
our own faith commitments. If I reject out of hand
all Islamic martyrdom, I run the risk of rejecting all
similar acts of faith that respond to persecution and
injustice. If I accept the 9/11 hijackers as martyrs, I
do greater damage to my own faith. The attacks on
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center confirm
in some people their impressions that religious
belief is a relic in the modern world, that in its
public form, religion is dangerous and irresponsible. These scholarly distinctions between aiming
for death and aiming to glorify God are, therefore,
more than just a scholarly exercise. Such distinctions preserve the possibility for Christian action in
the modern world. The attackers of 9/11 did
enough damage; we should not also give them the
power to erase forever the great good that can
come from the religious imagination. So I reject
Muhammad Atta and his ilk as martyrs, and in so
doing reject any description of martyrdom that
yearns for death; such actions do not follow the
will of a life-giving God. In turn, I reclaim a
martyrdom that puts the desire to affirm and
preserve God's creation above individual desire.

MANY

THINGS WILL CONTINUE TO DMDE

Muslims and Christians, particularly in areas of
doctrine and faith. At the same time, our own
struggles to understand God's inscrutable actions
in this world are intimately connected with theirs.
We share a great deal with Muslims, and in many
ways, this rather arcane issue of martyrdom can
provide an excellent starting point for discussions
between members of both faiths, since our attitudes toward the meaning of death and dying are,
in fact, remarkably similar. There is no better
reflection on the Christian meaning of death than
an odd bridge in Luzern, Switzerland, called the
Totentanzbriicke. A wooden bridge built in the late

middle ages, along its length is a series of panels
depicting the dance with death that we all perform
daily. Its medieval message was to remind passersby
that they are always engaged in a dance with death,
and they had better reform their evil ways and be
prepared to meet their Maker.
For me, that message of fear is always defeated
by the word "dance." Dance is one of those unique
human behaviors that can take everyday actions
and transform them into works of art. Similarly,
the fear of death can be transformed into a Dance
of Life, a dance for joy, when we realize the freedoms embedded in the very limit of death. As
Christians, we live our lives not for our own,
limited purposes, but for the larger purpose of
serving God. Perhaps this is what the Muslim
martyrs of love, the Sufis, are getting at in their
claims that dance can lead to a union with God.
What I know for certain is that Muslims and
Christians must transform histories of war into a
future of peaceful inter-dependence through critical, serious engagement with one another. We
must go beyond talking. By learning to dance and
work together, Muslims and Christians can help
one another move from violence to justice, from
seeking death to seeking life. f
Jonathan E. Brockopp is associate professor of
Religious Studies and History at the Pennsylvania
State University. This essay was first presented as
the Warren Rubel lecture in Christ College.
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A TESTIMONY
Dostoyevsky stared
into the dark holes
of the soldiers' guns
till even the firing squad
was eclipsed in darkness
and knew with the conviction
of madness that he would never
again face an empty universe
and when the guns did not explode
in his heart (the Czar's laugh
filling the frigid air of Petrograd,
a splendidly rehearsed spoof
on the young socialists
who worshipped words)
he wilfully embraced God
and in his prison in Omsk
wrestled with devils
and read the gospels
in stolen moments
of unspeakable peace
and pleaded jealous love
for his profound and perfect
Christ

Carl Leggo
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patterns of confusion and blunder:
Vietnam and Iraq
Fredrick Barton

L I K E MOST AMERICAN MEN MY AGE, I SPENT
several years of my early adulthood dealing with
Vietnam. My father was a committed supporter of
the Civil Rights Movement and followed his hero
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. into opposition to our
nation's involvement in Vietnam's civil war.
Following my dad's intellectual example as always,
I went off to college an opponent of a war I
presumed would be long over by the time I graduated. But it was still there to greet me as I
approached commencement ceremonies in the
Kent State/Cambodia spring of 1970.
Along with the other young men of my generation, I participated in the first Vietnam draft
lottery in the fall of 1969. The lottery was devised
as a strategy by the Nixon administration to stanch
the relentless waves of antiwar protests that had
swept the nation since 1967 and succeeded in
driving Lyndon Johnson from the White House
even though he was eligible for another term as
president. The Nixonians figured that by staging a
lottery they could let some air out of the antiwar
movement's expanding balloon. Some of the
anxious young men whose opposition to the war
was more personal than philosophical would be
protected by high draft numbers, thereby diminishing their zeal for opposing the war. The tactic
might have worked better had projections not indicated that eighty-five percent of the draft numbers
would be called.
Since my number was seven, the lottery
offered me no hope whatsover of escape. I was
ordered to a pre-induction mental and physical
examination two months before my graduation
date. With my student deferment expiring, my
college diploma seemed little more than a one-way
ticket to Vietnam. Throughout my last three years
in college, I marched in antiwar rallies. In 1968,
not yet old enough to vote but old enough to be
drafted if I dropped out of school, I worked in the

campaign of antiwar presidential candidate Eugene
McCarthy and in the equally unsuccessful
campaign of an antiwar congressional candidate. I
was part of a student group that secured a meeting
with Indiana Senator Birch Bayh to urge him into a
more critical stance of our policies in Vietnam.
People today forget how compromised congressional Democrats were by Johnson's prosecution of
the war and Democratic presidential candidate
Hubert Humphrey's Hamlet-like refusal to
denounce it. They sometimes forget that Nixon ran
as a "peace" candidate.
But all these formal and informal political
activities did nothing to protect me from being
drafted into a war I found morally offensive. As
graduation loomed, I was all alone in my struggle
with the draft. Or at least I was alone in my
personal resistance. I was never represented by legal
counsel. I had no connections with anyone of influence who might have been able to pull strings on
my behalf. On the other hand, I had plenty of intellectual and spiritual allies in the fight writ large.
Draft counseling centers sprang up in every major
city to supply draft resisters with advice about
options and with copies of selective service legislation and regulations. And like thousands of others
conducting their own struggle against the draft, like
other young men preponderantly from my class and
race, I became an expert on the system's procedures
and on my rights within the system.

I

HAVE ELSEWHERE DESCRIIlED THE FUNDAMENTAL

strategy of the draft resistance movement as akin to
the delay game basketball coaches sometimes
employed against superior opponents in the days
before the shot clock. The object was not to score
but to keep the ball so that the other team couldn't
beat you. Like others, I learned when and how to
file appeals that would buy maximum periods of

time even though I knew the appeals were sure to
be turned down. I learned how to petition for
changes of venue. I knew that taking certain kinds
of jobs allowed one to request deferments even
though those deferments were no longer being
granted. For three years after college, I played this
delay game relentlessly. I had jobs to pay the rent,
but I lived to fight the draft.
And I am proud of it.
And, like thousands of others who were
equally determined and equally resourceful in
turning the system on itself, I was eventually
successful. Nixon sustained the war far longer than
was conscionable, but over time the nation's political nausea with the War in Vietnam meant that not
even Nixon could sustain it. He pulled the troops
out, and those of us who fought the draft with
adequate stubbornness and guile were spared
having to participate in something we abhorred.

I

N THE LONG YEARS SINCE THE

end of the War in Vietnam, a kind
of fog has settled over the actions
of the war resisters. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton tried to
fudge his own resistance activities
with regard to the draft. Al Gore
largely dodged the tssue by
pointing to his fleeting service as a
military journalist. Now John
Kerry

has

made

his

military

never have won. Men fought and survived physically but carry emotional scars to this day. Those
who served, like Kerry, did so because they thought
they ought to or did so because they couldn't figure
out how not to. Those who marched in demonstrations and resisted the draft were centrally responsible for changing the nation's attitude about an
unjustifiable war.
These musings about the Vietnam War are
sadly pertinent to the contemporary American
political landscape, to the current presidential
campaign because of Republican insinuations
about the exact nature of Kerry's Navy service
record and subsequent antiwar stance and because
of Democratic complaints about the murkiness
surrounding President Bush's service in the
National Guard. They are also relevant because,
with every passing day, analogies to Vietnam are
impossible to avoid as we contemplate America's
involvement in Iraq. For enlightenI had jobs to pay the ment on war in general, we should
rent, but I lived tO
look at Errol Morris's Oscarfight the draft. And I winning 2003 documentary, The
Fog of War.
am proud of it. And,
The Fog of War is a feature-length
like thousands of
with
Robert
S.
interview
others who were
McNamara,
illustrated
as
equally determined
McNamara talks with images from
and equally
the events he describes and analyzes.
resourceful in turning Best known as Secretary of Defense
from 1961 to 1967, McNamara was
the systeff.Z on itselt

I was eventually

widely vilified as the architect of

heroism a central element in his
America's Vietnam disaster. Early in
successful.
campaign. Thirty years on, and we
the film, he claims to remember, at
haven't put Vietnam behind us. Nor should we. But
age two in 1918, Armistice Day, the end of World
like Clinton and Gore before him, Kerry gets dodgy
War I's "war to end all wars." As MeN amara talks,
when talk turns to his antiwar activities, despite the
Morris overlays footage of Woodrow Wilson
fact that his leadership role in the Vietnam Veterans
addressing cheering throngs, many wearing masks
to protect themselves from that year's virulent flu
Against the War first brought him to the national
epidemic. Morris told me in a conversation we had
stage. George W. Bush doesn't want to admit that
he benefited from family connections to seek sancabout his film that he sees the masks "as a chilling
tuary from Vietnam in the National Guard. And
harbinger of all the wars to come," all the wars
Kerry equivocates about his disgust with the war
WWI did not end after all, particularly the wars in
which Robert McNamara would play such a
having been great enough that he was ashamed of
central part. From McNamara's life, Morris' film
the honors he won for bravery on the battlefield.
He ought not be ashamed. But to truly understand
draws sundry pointed lessons applicable to our
America's role in Vietnam, one has to understand
current military policy in the Middle East.
Though The Fog of War covers McNamara's
that a brave man like Kerry was ashamed.
life
from
childhood, through his youthful appointThe men of the Vietnam generation have much
to be proud of, and they ought to embrace it. Too
ment as a business professor, to his
many men gave their lives for a war they could
resignation/firing (he reached the decision that he
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should resign simultaneously with Johnson's decision to replace him) as Defense Secretary at age 51,
most of the film focuses on three events:
McNamara's WWII service as an aide to air force
General Curtis LeMay, McNamara's involvement
in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his role as advisor
to presidents Kennedy and Johnson at pivotal
moments early in the Vietnam War.

MCNAMARA

WAS A KEY MEMllER OF THE

LeMay staff during the deadly fire-bombing raids
over Japan in 1945. Data-cruncher that he was,
McNamara assisted LeMay in determining how to
do the maximum damage per sortie. And they did
damage that some of us never knew' and few of us
can comfortably face. One night in March of 1945
American bombers burned to death 100,000 civilians in Tokyo. And though that was the worst of it,
that night was hardly the end of it. The firebombing eventually killed more than 50 percent of
the residents (and in some places up to 90 percent)
in 67 Japanese cities, cities the size of New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles and Cleveland included. The
firebombing was so effectively devastating that
LeMay thought the dropping of nuclear bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary. LeMay
also told McNamara that were they to lose the war,
he and his staff would be tried as war criminals.
From this experience McNamara had deduced the
principle "proportionality should be a guideline in
war." How many civilians is it acceptable to kill in
order to win a war?
McNamara was perpetually at John Kennedy's
side during the Cuban Missile Crisis. With the
world facing imminent atomic war, Kennedy
received two messages from Nikita Khrushchev,
one saying that the Soviets would pull its nuclear
arms out of Cuba if JFK would promise not to
invade Cuba, the other listing other more extensive
demands. A former diplomat to Russia advised
Kennedy to agree to the first offer and ignore the
demands of the second. That's not exactly what
Kennedy did, though McNamara says it is.
Nonetheless, there is obvious merit in the principle
he extracts from this experience: "empathize with
your enemy." This is a lesson the American military
has been slow to learn. In Vietnam our leaders
stated for public consumption that Asians valued
human life less than we did. As I write, we are
learning the horror of American soldiers sexually

humiliating Iraqis (and photographing themselves
doing it) in prisons once run by Saddam Hussein.
The white-hot fires of outrage throughout the
Muslim world are the price of our appalling failure
to see our enemy as human beings.
McNamara relates alarming facts about our
faulty intelligence during the missile crisis.
Kennedy and his advisors thought the missiles in
Cuba had yet to be fitted with warheads. Thus, at
LeMay's urging, they seriously contemplated a
massive air, sea, and land assault to destroy the
missiles before they could be armed. But they were
wrong. The missiles were fully operational and
capable of killing ninety million Americans. There
was a rational argument for decisive military
action, but had we attacked, human civilization
might have been destroyed. "We lucked out,"
McNamara argues and announces his principle
"rationality will not save us." Testimony from
inside the Bush White House calls into question
whether the president and his cabinet ever really
believed in the existence of Saddam's purported
"weapons of mass destruction," but our subsequent
failure to find them should give us grave pause
before we make war next time. In Iraq what wasn't
there couldn't hurt us. In Cuba, what wasn't
supposed to be there could have precipitated
Armageddon. What if Kennedy had surrendered to
LeMay's bellicosity? Saddam certainly didn't hesitate to launch Scuds into Israel in the first Gulf
War. What if Saddam had actually developed
armed nuclear missiles? Might invasion of Iraq
have resulted in the destruction of Tel Aviv?

A

POPULAR NOTION IN THE 1960, WAS THAT

McNamara was the cabinet hawk who urged first
Kennedy and then Johnson ever deeper into the
quagmire of Vietnam. "McNamara's War" the
press sometimes called Vietnam. But McNamara
claims that he saw the problems with military
action in Vietnam from the very first stages of the
war, advised Kennedy to begin withdrawing troops
in 1963, and developed a plan that Kennedy
approved to remove all American soldiers by 1965.
When Morris asks point blank, then, who was
responsible for Vietnam, McNamara finally
concedes with obvious anguish that it was Johnson.
McNamara's version of his role in Vietnam is hotly
disputed by some who have seen this movie. And
this despite the fact that Morris has discovered and

includes a taped conversation in the Oval Office
between McNamara and JFK on October 2, 1963,
and another between McNamara and LBJ on
February 25, 1964, that definitively seem to
substantiate McNamara's account.
Asked about those who think he lets
McNamara off too easy on this point-that
McNamara was an enabler at best and an active
collaborator or even instigator at worst-Morris
says that he has listened to all the tapes that are
available and believes they show that McNamara is
telling the truth. "People have also claimed
McNamara exaggerated his World War II record,"
Morris told me, "but the documents I examined
bear him out."
Some viewers of this film have objected to
what they see as a sympathetic portrayal of a man
who was involved in decisions that killed millions
of people. Nearly three and a half million
Vietnamese died in a war McNamara supervised
and now states without a single qualification that
we never had a chance of winning. Over 58,000
American soldiers were killed, countless others
maimed for life. Yet McNamara did not resign to
protest Johnson's decisions and never spoke
against the war after he left office, not even when
Richard Nixon reneged on his campaign promise
of peace, rained more bombs on North Vietnam
than were dropped in World War II and expanded
the war across the border into Cambodia. One
wonders if thirty years from now Secretary of State
Colin Powell will be as candid in his assessments of
Iraq as McNamara is now about Vietnam.
Errol Morris and I were born exactly three
weeks apart. Like me, he protested against the war
in the 1960s and, like me, he says he hasn't changed
his attitude about Vietnam "one whit. I thought it
was appalling then; it remains appalling to me
now." So why the sympathetic portrait of
McNamara? "I don't at all think that McNamara
was blameless," Morris says. "But I am moved by
his struggle. He is unusual among political figures
in his willingness to look back over his life and
examine his actions. Though perhaps not loudly
enough or without qualification, he is willing to
admit having been wrong. Some will say his books
and his appearance in my film are a strategy to
whitewash his responsibility. And I think there is an
element of that. What human being wouldn't want
to construe his life in the best possible way? But
McNamara dares to wonder if the world has to be
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the way it is. He dares wonder if we could ever
learn to live without war."
It is in Errol Morris' nature to look for the best
in people even as he endeavors to tell the truth
about them. His devastating portrait of Holocaust
denier Fred A. Leuchter in this film is nonetheless
relentlessly humane. He encourages us not to hate
Leuchter, but to feel sorry for his stupidity. Morris
has far more sympathy for McNamara and obviously sees him as a man in search of redemption.
But the film does not suggest that McNamara's
journey is done. Morris gives McNamara the
opportunity to express sorrow and admit guilt, and
he won't do it. McNamara may be making progress
in his soul-searching, but the picture makes clear
that, to a sad extent, he is still lost in the fog of war.
And so it is with many who have sat where
McNamara once sat.

Now

WE ARE LOST IN ANOTHER FOG OF OUR

own making. And this time the situation is both
worse and less excusable. The legal beginnings of
the hostilities in Vietnam and those in Iraq are
nettlesomely similar. Lyndon Johnson extracted
congressional permission to pursue military action
in Vietnam through the infamous Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, a war act based on an incident Morris
shows never happened. An American ship was
supposedly attacked by the North Vietnamese but,
in fact, it wasn't. George W. Bush elicited war
powers from congress and built a "coalition of the
willing" based on "weapons of mass destruction"
that don't exist. President Bush asserted that
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were
terrorist allies, but no evidence has emerged to
substantiate such a charge and much evidence
exists to disprove it.
Vietnam faced a spiraling decline in public
support. Iraq is becoming a matter of public
concern at a much faster rate. Though John Kerry
now tries to soft-peddle his public condemnation
of them in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Vietnam
produced My Lai and other human rights attrocities. Gulf War II has already splashed the front
pages of world newspapers and lead stories of
evening newscasts with the foulness of events in
Abu Ghraib prison. Vietnam protesters were
taunted to "go back to Russia" while war
supporters insisted "my country: right or wrong."
Iraq has yet to generate the kind of mass protest

Clarke maintains that the president and his closest
that Vietnam did, but if the war lasts long enough,
advisers were making plans to invade Iraq during
and the cost in American lives continues to rise, it
their first days in office. The terrorist attacks on
will. Vietnam became a quagmire because, having
New York and Washington gave them the excuse to
gotten us in, neither Johnson nor Nixon could
do so.
determine how to get us out, a dilemma Robert
McNamara reflects on at length. The Bush administration plows forward with its plan to "hand over
OF THffi ffi WHY I FAVOR THE DRAFf EVEN
sovereignty" to the Iraqis by the end of June 2004.
But whatever ceremonies are performed, no one
though I spent three years of my young life fighting
believes that American troops will be, or at this
it. Average Americans ought to have a personal
point even ought to be, withdrawn anytime soon.
stake in policies that lead to and sustain war. In the
Still, there are telling differences. McNamara
aftermath of victory over tyranny in World War II
and the astonishing generosity of the Marshall
proves convincing in his interviews with Morris
Plan, America was a beacon of hope to the develthat the tragic blunder of Vietnam can only be
oping world in the 1950s. But we squandered a
understood in the context of the Cold War. The
Soviet colossus was a genuine threat to Westerngreat portion of our standing and moral authority
style democracy and to world peace. After the
by trying to impose our will on a tiny Asian nation
Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy - - - - - - - - - - - that we never understood and for too
All of this is why I long didn't grasp that we couldn't
believed that Soviet influence did not
favor the draft
cow. Now we are making the same
have to be contested in every corner
of the earth. That's why he was able
even though I
mistake again. President Bush promto devise an exit plan from Vietnam. spent three years of ised that we would be greeted as
Lyndon Johnson, in tragic contrast,
my young life
liberators. A year after the collapse of
bought the tortured wisdom of the
Saddam's army we are suffering
fighting it. Average greater casualties during the occupa"domino theory" which held that
Americans ought
tion than during the war. We have
failing to fight communism in
Vietnam meant having eventually to
to have a personal failed to learn every lesson Robert
fight it in Australia. The collapse of
stake in policies
McNamara declares essential to
the Soviet bloc a decade and half ago
that lead to and
deciding to wage war.
proved that notion entirely wrong,
Bring back the draft, and we'll see
sustain
war.
how long the nation's young men and
but at least it was forged amid a
quarter-century of extremely tense
women and their fathers and mothers
will tolerate a foreign policy so arrogant that it
relations and genuine provocations. The Bush
administration began to beat the drums of war in
sneers even at the need for allies. One of the things
Iraq in the context of a post-September-eleven
I cherish most about my own struggle with the draft
world frenetic with fear of Islamic terrorists.
is something my friend Will Campbell once told me.
Indeed, the American public accepted the determi"We won a war," he said of his generation that
nation to invade Iraq and fumed over the refusal of
served in World War II. "That was a good thing. But
your generation stopped a war. And that was an
NATO partners Germany and France to fight by
our side precisely because Americans bought the
even better thing.
notion that deposing Saddam would make us safer.
What segment of the American populace now
Fredrick Barton is professor of English at the
University of New Orleans where he currently
believes that the Iraq war has increased rather than
serves as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
diminished our national security? And if former
Bush administration official Richard A. Clarke is
and Provost. His fourth novel, A House Divided,
right in his book Against All Enemies: Inside
won the William Faulkner Prize in fiction. His
award-winning first novel, The El Cholo Feeling
America's War on Terrorism, September 11, 2001
provided not a context for the Iraqi war but rather
Passes, has just been re-released in a new trade
a pretext. That's a very grave difference indeed.
paperback edition.
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student is the father
] ohann S. Buis

THE

SnJDENT ffi THE FATHER TO THIS MUSICOWGJST,

and I have been thinking recently about my student
days and the changes that I, and my homeland,
South Africa, have undergone in the last decade. As
I think back upon my struggles as a student nearly
three decades ago, it is not surprising that musicians-a dance fiddler and a brass band directorhave shaped me. But three figures loom the largest
in my student days-two icons of the twentieth
century, Paul Robeson and Nelson Mandela, and
an earlier man of conscience, Martin Luther.
In our educational system, the year-end examinations determined the results of the entire year's
work. With only pen in hand, we entered the
Spartan surroundings of Jameson Hall, the domeshaped auditorium in dark wood paneling, in ritualized silence. Three hundred tables stood in regimented rank and file in that cavernous echo
chamber. You entered the large hall to take your
stand in a three-way battle of the exam question,
your mind, and the clock. The questions were ruthless. The clock remained unforgiving.
An inanimate object, the clock had its army of
mercenaries: men and women of a certain age (and
race) who enforced the rules of combat. Proctors,
as these officers of the clock were known, enforced
the punctual start and finish to the examination
session. The rustling of paper, an occasional cough,
and the simultaneous shuffle of chairs punctuated
the beginning and end of the three-hour battle.
The anxiety caused by the oversight of proctors was, of course, nothing new. In a police state
where classmates and people in authority thrived
on being informants for the apartheid state, every
part of one's daily interaction was a potential field
of contest. One had to be battle ready. A middleclass child of color from an Afrikaans-speaking
rural hometown, I was accustomed to the gratuitous insults of white public servants or shop assistants. Defensive verbal blows would usually

suffice; the skirmish would come to a quick and
decisive end simply by my retorting in English
rather than Afrikaans, placing the offender on the
defense. Such childish delights became the proving
ground for an internalized combat of pen, paper,
and clock, the perfect non-violent struggle.
Perhaps the greatest motivation for me was
that this battle was honorable. I was acutely aware
that my non-university-trained relatives held great
aspirations for me. As the eldest of seven siblings,
the obligation to succeed took on even more
importance. The rural town in which I grew up
deprived me of the local library, the municipal
auditorium, and town parks. However, I benefited
enormously from the rural setting, being far away
from the distractions of the city and having parents
with enormous drive. I was prepared for the examination battle.
"To stand" implies place, somewhere to act. So
it was that I would stand on the majestic steps
leading to Jameson Hall, towering high upon the
slopes of Table Mountain, like the steps leading to
Parnassus, daunting and forbidding. To my left,
facing the unfolding panorama of the Cape Flats
and False Bay, was the Student Union, a place of
recreation and community action. To my right was
Jagger Library, a place of obligation and reward.
Standing upon those steps, I would remember the
place of my father and his ancestors several
hundred miles beyond the mountains that bordered
my line of vision from Jameson Hall steps.
Alongside a massive canyon on the Gouritz
river in the Southern Cape lay the only blackowned farm in the region, home to two communities, one Lutheran and one Episcopal. A Lutheran
missionary, sent out from Germany by the Rheinish
Mission arrived on horseback sometime during the
nineteenth century and converted my great-grandfather, Paul Buis, to Christianity. Following his
conversion, this renowned dance fiddler took his

fiddle and tossed it into the fire in the presence of
his wife and twelve children. To the African mind,
an object used for one purpose cannot be "undedicated" and consecrated to a new purpose; the
instrument's voice and spirit had to be silenced.
Though not a fetish, the violin had the potential to
take on such properties, and that instrument's
unstated role had to be exorcised, preferably by fire.
Two generations later, another German
missionary offered to pay for the high school and
teacher training education for the youngest two
children of one of Paul's sons. The youngest and
only son of this man was my father. He made the
transition from peasantry to professionalism, as
elementary school principal, brass band director,
mathematics teacher, and community leader. From
him I learned the unwavering determination of
standing firm on matters of conscience.
I also owed a great debt to that hero of enormous musical ability, academic gift, and activism,
Paul Robeson. The man with the sonorous, deep
bass voice could stare the Committee on OnAmerican Activities in the face and claim his
rightful place in the land in which his father was a
slave; my government-issued racial permit to study
music at a white university was small in comparison. If Paul Robeson could stand tall, his voice
ringing the truth of the dignity of all persons,
perhaps I too could sing.
To the far left of the unfolding Jameson Hall
steps panorama, one could see the distant Robben
Island where Nelson Mandela was serving his life
sentence. At that time neither his face nor his
words could be seen in print. "I have fought for a
non-racial South Africa," he said at his trial. Then
he continued, "This is an ideal for which, if needs
be, I am prepared to die." When I thought of the
struggles of Mandela, I had no choice but to
perform at my best.
Those steps on the slopes of Table Mountain
yielded their stunning view on many bright
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sunshiny days, reminding me that I would have to
give an account of myself, and tempting me with
the view of the student union on one side. People
of color like me studied at whites-only universities
at the apartheid government's pleasure; I could not
afford to fail. A constant sword of Damocles over
my head provided the incentive to equal or better
the work of academically better-prepared students.
So I fled to the books. Daily, I faced reminders
of the hopes that I represented to others. There
were the laborers who picked me up in their panel
van almost every day, making no secret that they
took pride in their "varsity boy." There were the
black gardeners who tended the wooded grounds I
walked on my way to and from lectures at the
upper campus. During one rainstorm, I sought
shelter in the shed with them. When the rain
stopped, one of them took off his hat, put it on my
head, and sent me off to class. The daily prayers
and dreams of an extended clan of relatives were to
see their first university graduate.
The accounting would come soon enough in
the examination hall. That place became my
personal crossroads of hope or despair. I would
love to stand on those steps today, nearly thirty
years later. I will return to those steps and remind
myself of a place where a young man stood long
ago. And I will remember the songs of my country,
of Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, and
Ladysmith Black Mambazo. And I will remember
the music of my family, and the courageous voices
of Robeson, Mandela, and Luther. I will offer my
paean of praise to the Almighty for seeing me
through a period that seemed impossible to me. I
will return to the place and know it for the first
time again. There is where I'll stand. f

Johann S. Buis is Associate Professor of Music in the
Conservatory of Music at Wheaton College, Illinois.

Richard Wightman Fox. Jesus in
America: Personal Savior, Cultural
Hero, National Obsession. New
York: HarperCollins, 2004.
Stephen Prothero. American Jesus:
How the Son of God Became a
National Icon. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2003.
The other day on the bus to
O'Hare, I heard an AfricanAmerican man discussing Mel
Gibson's The Passion of the Christ:
"It was like Rodney King got a
whuppin' with a ruler," he said,
admiring the graphic reality with
which Gibson portrayed the
sadistic abuse of Jesus in the hands
of vicious Roman soldiers. The
observation reminded me how
deeply our perceptions of sacred
matters are shaped by the medium
in which we perceive them. A
video sequence of the brutal treatment of a man by police officers
became the register in which this
man viewed the cinematic violation
of Jesus, or rather, 'the Christ,' the
Messiah, as Gibson prefers. The
degree to which the very medium
in each case threw the factuality of
the presented event into question
did not seem to matter to the
speaker. Perhaps that is because,
like many viewers, he took the
representation to be accurate. No
less likely, he took the violations of
Jesus and Rodney King to be
comparable, though not equal, in
severity. The two instances of
abuse might even serve to corroborate one another as media events.
Belief is always belief also in a
medium. Seeing is believing only

when belief is first belief in a
particular medium of seeing.
Watching Rodney King get beaten
or Jesus whipped to a pulp seems
truthful in part because modern
viewers are inclined to accept
video and film for faithful means
of representation. Our impulse is
to want to believe, to treat the
medium of film as transparent, as a
window through which we
glimpse the real. When this view
of a medium is joined to a disposition of commitment (that some
police harbor racist rage or that
Jesus was God's instrument for
substitutionary atonement), seeing
is believing, indeed.
The diversity of views of Jesus
is narrated very nicely in two new
books on the history of Jesus in
America from the Puritans to the
present. Authors Stephen Prothero
and Richard Fox demonstrate that
portrayals of Jesus in art, literature, song, theology, and social
practice vary because of the
cultural diversity of Americans and
because of their competition with
one another in wave after wave of
immigration that began with the
first landing of Europeans.
Prothero, religious historian
and chair of the department of religion at Boston University, is more
interested in the breadth of
American Jesuses. The first half of
his deftly written volume sketches
the career of Jesus from Jefferson's
evening redactions (when he
clipped from the Bible only those
verses of the Gospels that met with
his notion of representational
veracity: little more than the moral
teachings of Jesus in the Sermon

on the Mount) to the present.
Along the way, Prothero portrays
the gentle fellow of a sentimentalized Victorian Jesus, the toughened
man of Muscular Christianity, and
Teddy Roosevelt's gospel of the
Strenuous Life, and ends with the
hip and celebrity Jesuses of the
second half of the twentieth
century. After that, Prothero turns
to what he smartly calls the "reincarnations" of Jesus in American
culture, by which he means the
non-Christian versions of the
person and mythos: Mormon,
Black Moses, Rabbi, and Asian
guru and mystic. He shows that
Jesus is more than the Christian
savior; he is a widely revered
figure whose cache of wisdom and
profound moral capital make him
appealing to many American
newcomers as well as to religious
syntheses taking place on the
swirling edges of religious cultures
in the never stable mix of
American belief.
Richard Fox, a historian at the
University of Southern California,
has focused his effort on the purely
Christian history of Jesus, and
largely on the Protestant interpretations and evocations of Christ.
Fox's book is a longer, more
detailed, more nuanced study. It is
also conducted within the
thoughtful frame of the author's
Catholic faith, or at least his
youthful formation as a Catholic.
He opens with memories of his
own upbringing, of his faithful
father's efforts at catechesis and
devotion, and ends with a moving
account of a friend who became a
priest and died of AIDS. The two

men, father and friend, embody
Christ for Fox, bringing the overarching and transcendent figure into
a personal and material form that is
clearly endearing to an author who
has undertaken something of the
same formation and transmission
with his own children.
Cultural historians of Fox's
caliber-and he is among the
finest-usually don't indulge in
such personal details when
studying their subjects. But there is
something about Jesus that invites
this personal violation of scholarly
norms. To be sure, the reader
forgets the author's engagement
with faith for most of the book.
Fox plunges into the rich and
varied history of Jesus among
Hispanics, Native Americans,
Europeans, Anglos, and African
Americans from sixteenth century
to present. Yet Fox's account
begins and ends with memories of
father, friend, and his own children. These personal relationships
are the broadest medium through
which the author views Jesus
because they were in place before
he was a scholar.
The warmth of these memories
has everything to do with the
American Jesus. Devotion to the
person of Jesus is characteristically
modern and familiarly American.
This is the Jesus of a faith that
thrives on comfort and safety, on
the therapeutic values of personal
affirmation and positive selfesteem in light of one's 'personal
relationship' with Jesus. Of course,
in contrast to Fox the historian,
most American Christians do not
regard Jesus as the object of historical reflection but only as an intimate presence in their lives. Fox's
book serves as a substantial work
of historical memory. Americans
may think they know who their
Jesus is. As Fox and Prothero
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show, the truth is that he has been
all things to all people. Fox
patiently and even-handedly leads
readers through the meandering
and fascinating story of American
Christianity's many ways of experiencing Jesus.
Prothero moves more quickly
over the course of American
cultural history, painting m
broader strokes. The result is a
quicker, easier read than Fox's
book. That economy comes at
some expense, however. For
instance, advocates of the eighteenth century will object to the
general claim that Prothero makes
about the nineteenth century: that
it turned the corner on earlier

Americans may think
they know who their
] esus is. The truth is
that he has been all
things to all people.
periods by becoming the evangelical century, focusing on Jesus, the
second person of the trinity, in
contrast to the prominence of the
Father throughout the colonial
American era. This ignores the
christocentrism of Anglicans, the
importance of Christ for Quakers
and
Shakers,
Moravians,
Lutherans, and Pietists, not to
mention the Catholics in North
America. Yet by focusing on the
Calvinist theocentrism of the
Puritan tradition, Prothero is able
to underscore the revolutionary
shift toward Jesus piety in the nineteenth century. In many ways, that
is the revolution widely inaugurated by the Second Great
Awakening, which continued in the
long series of subsequent revivals
from Dwight Moody to Billy
Sunday and Billy Graham in the
twentieth century. The stress laid

by conservatives and liberals alike
on the person of Jesus invited new
visual measures for cultivating the
all-important "personal relationship" with him. In the second half
of the nineteenth century through
the middle of the twentieth, devotional portraits of Christ became
important
among
American
Protestants of many kinds. It is
impossible to understand the eventual triumph of Warner Sallman's
ubiquitous Head of Christ without
the rise of Jesus piety.
Fox notes that Protestants and
Catholics in America have grown
closer in many ways (371) and
Prothero rightly wonders if the
next age of American Christianity
will shift from the second person
of the Trinity to the third (303).
Each observation underscores the
degree of change that marks the
career of the American Jesus. The
way that Protestants and Catholics
have flocked to see Gibson's film
suggests that Fox is right; and the
rise of Pentecostalism since the
early twentieth century in the
United States and throughout the
world supports Prothero's intuition. In either case, as immigration and transnationalism continue
to shape the religious landscape of
the United States, the American
Jesus will surely move in greater
step with the global rhythms of his
shifting identity. By some estimates, as many as ninety percent of
the congregations of the Lutheran
Church in Ethiopia today are
Charismatic. African missionaries
are traveling to Europe and the
United States to undertake the
slow work of evangelism. The old
will be made new and the
American Jesus will acquire a face
and an accent to match.

David Morgan

John T. McGreevy. Catholicism
and American Freedom: A History.
New York and London: W.W.
Norton, 2003.
Jesuits John Ford and Gerald Kelly
were two of the most important
Catholic intellectuals in mid-twentieth century America. This pair of
moral theologians declared the
position of the church on a multitude of practical concerns: eating
meat on Fridays, fasting before
communion, and perhaps most
controversially, using contraceptives. Their teaching was incorporated into sermons and into the
confessional, extending their influence in the everyday lives of the
faithful. In spite of their national
and international prominence,
Ford and Kelly are virtually
strangers to the pages of mainstream American histories.
These two moral theologians
are, in this respect, representative
of many figures in John T.
McGreevy's impressive Catholicism and American Freedom.
McGreevy offers fresh interpretations of American religious history
by the very fact of addressing the
material. Of course, Catholics are
not exactly invisible in other narratives. There are histories of
Catholics in the United States, and
their presence is figured into
social, political, and labor histories. But Catholics often appear in
the roles cast for them by other
forces or others' ideas: as victims
of nativist prejudice, as the rankand-file in the nineteenth-century
Democratic party, as immigrants
filling out tenement blocks or
factory rolls in industrial cities. In
contrast, McGreevy's is predominantly an intellectual history which
aims to integrate the thought and
experience of Catholics within the
broader American story.

It is not doctrinal differences
that
divide
Catholics
and
Protestants here but two different
understandings
of
liberty.
McGreevy argues that Catholics,
rather than simply signing on to
the American way or-as they
were sometimes accused--casting
up balky old-world intransigence
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, maintained a nuanced,
critical engagement with American
values. Catholics agreed with
American ideals when they
comported with their own religious worldview, and offered in
addition a separate notion of
liberty. But where Americans
emphasized independence and
autonomy, Catholics situated
liberty in family and community,
praising not the freedom to do
whatever
one
wished
but
"freedom only from wrong."
Nineteenth-century
debates
about liberty here are three-way
conversations among American
Protestants and two groups of
Catholics:
the
ultramontane
conservatives and the more liberal
ones. Catholics in the United States
gave varied responses to questions
about slavery, the growth of the
state, and policies toward the poor.
While some of the liberal Catholics
featured here come off as distinguished and articulate, ultramontane priests more often had the ear
of their congregations. This is
particularly evident in McGreevy's
discussion of slavery and the Civil
War. The rare Catholic leaders
who voiced antislavery sentiments
were treated with suspicion, as in
the case of Orestes Brownson, the
brilliant
Catholic
convert.
Brownson's foil in the book is
James McMaster, colorful editor of
the New York Freeman's journal,
whose criticism of Lincoln's war
effort landed him in jail.

McGreevy's employment of
European sources to elaborate the
story of American Catholicism is
among the richest elements of the
book. His familiarity with these
sources allows him to follow the
intellectual exchange both ways
across the Atlantic. One of the
first currents of European thought
to be transplanted to the United
States came in reaction to the
European revolutions of the
1840s. These upheavals were a
turning point for many Catholics
who emigrated to America,
making them leery of the destruction and chaos that could attend
apparently progressive policies.
Prominent Catholics in the United
States kept up contact with some
of their counterparts in Europe,
discussing developments in politics and the church. Brownson,
for instance, established contact
with John Henry Newman and
Lord Acton, the German historian
Ignaz von Dollinger, and French
leaders Charles de Montalembert
and Bishop Felix Dupanloup.
Later, Europeans and Americans
debated Rerum Novarum and
single-tax proposals; in the twentieth century, Jacques Maritain
and John Courtney Murray traveled between both continents,
advocating religious liberty and
human rights.
Catholics
and
American
Protestants squared off over
important issues: the proper
spheres of church and state,
slavery, labor and welfare, contraception, abortion, and-perennially-education. The process and
goals of teaching children crystallized some of the starkest disagreements between the different ideas
of freedom. Should church or state
be responsible for schooling?
Should children of different backgrounds
have
a
common

curriculum, or should curricula be
tailored to families' beliefs? Is religious education a religious obligation? And, crucially, who should
pay for this project? Catholics
insisted that education could not
be divorced from its moral basis,
so that nonsectarian schools were
fundamentally misguided-and
could also be downright inhospitable to their Catholic pupils.
Protestant
rhetoric
against
Catholic education not infrequently verged on the hysterical,
warmng that these religious
schools threatened the very foundations of the republic.
The battle over education
opens with the book's dramatic
first pages, in the Eliot School
Rebellion of 1859. In this Boston
school a ten-year-old Catholic boy,
Thomas Whall, refused to recite
the Ten Commandments according
to their formulation in the King
James Bible. Whall was backed by
Father Bernardine Wiget, a Swiss
Jesuit who had fled persecution in
the revolutionary 1840s. The Eliot
School rebellion brought the
Catholic revival of the mid-nineteenth century into conflict with
the common school movement.
Whall won this particular round,
and confrontations like these
helped spark the development of
independent, Catholic schools.
The school question flared
again and again. In the 1870s
Catholics and Protestants quarreled over government aid to
parochial schools. Locales tried
different remedies. Cincinnati
attempted the consolidation of
public and parochial schools.
Poughkeepsie funded schools that
promised to hire Catholic teachers
but forbade the teaching of religion during regular class hours.
Some Protestants proved more
willing to remove religion from
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school altogether than to risk
having their funds be used to
support Catholicism. For their
part, some priests warned parishioners about the dangers of state
education and wanted to refuse
the sacraments to parents who
failed to send their children to
parochial schools.
Catholics can count their
schools as among their most
impressive achievements, building
what McGreevy calls "the world's
largest private school system." But
in other areas, Catholic resistance
to some American principles and
practices is based on an uncharitable reading of the American
project. Certain figures in the
book seem determined to view
American culture and politics in
the least favorable light. Perhaps
my sense of this was colored by
reading Catholicism and American
Freedom by night working through
the pages of Little House on the
Prairie with my five-year-old
daughter by day. The familiar
protagonists of that classic, the
Ingalls family, could be an example
of what concerned Catholics:
parents struggling to subdue the
land, children socialized in town
schools, all full of an independent,
pioneering spirit. But self-reliance
is not all there is to a story in
which moral education and family
take center stage. Ma and Pa
Ingalls were supported by their
community-by their German and
Scandinavian neighbors, by fellow
homesteaders who shared labor
and tools, and by the church they
walked miles each Sunday to
attend. From the colonial period,
American liberty was sustained by
more than individual rights and
autonomy. Those principles developed with a regard for the kind of
ordered liberty that Catholics also
championed.

Some Catholics in the book
praise these aspects of American
liberty, but only after these things
seem to have passed away. Making
their case against mid-twentiethcentury liberals, several priests
hearken back to the American
founding, insisting that they, with
their respect for natural law, were
honoring Jefferson and Madison,
whom contemporary liberals had
left behind. Francis J. Lucey, S.J.
found it painfully ironic that John
Dewey, "who most radically
applied the ax to the principles
upon which this democratic
government. . .is erected," was
"hailed as the philosopher of
democracy." Another priest even
discerned that "there is vastly more
in common between the modern
Catholic and
the
colonial
Protestant than between the old
colonial Protestant and the modern
secularized product of public
education." This rather startling
concession to the Puritans suggests
recognition of what had long been
the case: American liberty rested
on morality as well as autonomy. In
fact, the Catholic view of "freedom
only from wrong" uncannily
echoes John Winthrop's insistence
that liberty means doing that which
is good, just, and honest.
New sympathy for older ideas
of political liberty did not necessarily bring Catholics any closer to
their contemporaries. At times,
American and Catholic ideas of
freedom appear so far apart that
one wonders how they could ever
be brought together. Several developments, however, served to
bridge them. First, Rome's efforts
to address the "social question" of
labor in industrial societies-articulated m encyclicals Rerum
Novarum and Quadragesimo
Anna-drew favorable response
from some American liberals.
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Democratic politics of the 1930s
represent the high point of the
"liberal-Catholic alliance." The
next advance owed much to the
work of Jacques Maritain and
John Courtney Murray, who urged
Rome toward increased care for
democracy, human rights, and religious liberty. In the United States,
Catholics also gave timely support
to the civil rights movement.
Economic and political issues
drew Catholics and American
liberals closer, but cultural differences drove them back apart.
Chapters titled "Life I" and "Life
II" chart Catholic positions on
contraception and abortion, positions staked out in a culture rapidly
moving to opinions contrary to the
church's teaching. Here the debate
about contraception is centered in
the church, where it bitterly
divided those who wanted to
change the traditional ban from
those who upheld it. McGreevy
suggests that the battle over birth
control compromised the fight
against abortion, weakening a
united front against legalized abortion and allowing non-Catholics to
see this as another attempt by the
church to impose its morality on
others. The abortion battle
certainly
undermined
the
rapprochement of Catholics and
American liberals, especially as the
latter argued their pro-choice case
by emphasizing autonomy and
personal privacy, thus drawing on
the definition of freedom Catholics
had always found suspect. While
McGreevy praises the achievement
of some Catholic leaders in
opposing abortion, he gives too
much credit to historiography that
likens abortion rights to civil
rights, a comparison McGreevy
calls "not wrong, just incomplete."
The book's final chapter takes
on another highly charged issue,

broaching the church's 2002 sexual
abuse scandal. The scandal
certainly merits attention, and the
timing of the book made it almost
impossible not to mention it. But
this section feels tacked on to the
rest of the work, not least because
the way it is introduced-'~d
then none of this mattered"undercuts the fascinating material
that precedes it. The book's close
might have returned instead to the
issue that generated such controversy in previous chapters: education. Now, when Catholics still
maintain their substantial school
systems, the United States Supreme
Court finally seems willing to
permit government funds for those
institutions while some Protestants
express their own doubts about
secularized
state
schools.
McGreevy does provide a brief
update on schools, but further
comment would have been
welcome given education's importance throughout his narrative.
Catholic and American ideas of
freedom have benefited from their
interaction with each other. And
readers
will
benefit
from
McGreevy's thoughtful look at
their interaction. The United
States harbors both laudable and
regrettable expressions of liberty,
and we might well consider
Jacques Maritain's assessment:
Maritain confessed "how deeply
we love America and have been
intoxicated by her soul and her
hopes, that great human dream
which is permeated with the
Gospel infinitely more than the
Americans themselves believe."

Agnes Howard

Tom Christenson. The Gift and
Task of Lutheran Higher Education.
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004.
I suspect one defining characteristic of reflective Lutheran educators is their persistent, invigorated
search for understanding what it is
to be engaged in Lutheran higher
education. Whereas Catholics rely
on their long tradition of university education and sacralization of
cultural institutions, the Reformed
tradition educates from the
perspective of a Christian worldview whose central teaching is that
all truth is God's truth. Since the
respective disciplines can be taught
in ways that reflect diverse worldviews, the integration of faith and
learning constitutes a critical task
for the educational institution, its
faculty, and its students. Christian
convictions form not only some of
the presuppositions, but also the
consistent thread that holds
Christian education together.
Lutherans operate within their
own (one might suggest) worldview. One consistent affirmation
running through all Lutheran
discussions is that Lutherans bring
to the table a rich theological
heritage, as is clear in Ernest
Simmons'
Lutheran
Higher
Education, (though, of course, an
emphasis upon theology is not
unique to Lutheran reflection on
higher education). Well aware of
this, Tom Christenson commences
his discussion of Lutheran higher
education by delineating a
Lutheran theological and anthropological perspective. His chapter
on Lutheran theology identifies
eight fundamental themes: God as
creator (we are loved by God and
are to be earthly stewards of the
earth), sin, grace, freedom, vocation, sacraments, theology of the
cross, and faith. Accompanying

these more traditional theological
themes are emphases on human
finitude and divine sovereignty in
whose face we must confess
humility, a dialogic point of view,
and the role of paradox.
What Christenson contributes
to the discussion of Lutheran
higher education is an emphasis on
what might seem to be an
oxymoron:
Lutheran
epistemology. Christenson quickly points
out that a Lutheran epistemology is
authentic, but not necessarily
unique or exclusive (114). Founded
on Lutheran theological principles,
his epistemology describes human
knowing as (a) characterized by
fallibility arising not only from
finitude but also from sin, (b)
furthered in faithful criticisms of
human institutions and ways of
knowing, (c) founded on the
Gospel, and (d) fraught with "tense
conjunctions" (paradoxes).
This model is a reaction to
both Cartesian and Reformed
views of knowing. It draws on a
mix of insights from various
authors. From Mark Schwehn and
Parker Palmer, Christenson affirms
that knowledge should grow out
of love for the subject matter and
the relations found in learning.
From feminism he takes knowing
as an embodied experience, where
from a position of accountability
we preference the disenfranchised.
Suspiciousness of all absolute
claims, self-suspiciousness, ambiguity, and doubt are central epistemological motifs.
Christenson's Lutheran epistemology is not a systematic philosophical epistemology delineating
how to obtain knowledge or to
justify and assess claims. Rather,
he proffers what might be termed
a principled or practical epistemology, a way to look at the world
(a worldview?). This hints at the
38 ,39 The Cresset Trinity j2004

larger issue of a significant difference between the Reformed (and
Catholic) and Lutheran perspectives. While Reformed educators
are willing to address paradigms
and advocate a unified worldview,
Lutherans like Christenson are
wary of such. They consistently
reject such troublesome terms as
"Christian biology," "Christian
chemistry," "Christian political
science," or "Christian business,"
and for some, even "Christian
college or university." Such privileging of Christianity allegedly
would squelch the openness of
inquiry (97). At the same time,
however, Christenson notes that
this rejection does not mean "we
should pursue these inquiries by
following their secular paradigms,
because our argument is that
following those paradigms has not
resulted m pursumg those
inqumes as well as they can be
pursued" (134). But if secular paradigms exist for the respective
academic disciplines, and if the
Gospel is in some sense foundational, then are there not at least
elements of a Christian paradigm
that should play a role in the value
laden teaching, application, scholarship, and critique of the respective disciplines? If I read
Christenson rightly, this is
precisely what he advocates when
he suggests that we teach from
perspectives of sustainable development, attending to matters of
justice and the disadvantaged,
moral responsibility in development of technology, and human
wholeness.
Christenson promotes eight
epistemic "principles": wonder,
openness, realization of connectedness, freedom, faithfulness while
still being critical of claims to
personal or institutional ultimacy,
suspiciousness about motives and

claims, vocation in a life of service
to others, arid an affirmation of
the importance of the search for
meaning and hope. His principles
form a helpful way of thinking
about pedagogy, constructing a
curriculum that includes both a
disciplinary emphasis as well as a
coherent
general
education
program, and forming a community. I leave it for readers to
discover the delightful and
thoughtful ways Christenson
applies his epistemic principles.
The book's strengths lie in the
freshness with which Christenson
puts forth his principled epistemology and teases out its practical
import. Its weakness, from my
perspective, lies in Christenson's
implementation of this epistemic
vision in the academic curriculum
and community.
Christenson
insightfully helps us see that the
Lutheran college or university
cannot be what he terms a firstorder focal community, where
admission is based only on agreement on positions taken. It cannot
even be a second-order focal
community where one agrees on
positions while being willing to
diverge on the justifications of the
core positions. He believes that a
"higher-order focal community is
what we wish to pursue" (171).
Rightly so, but when Christenson
spells this out in terms of nine
meta-principles, we get something
indistinguishable from an enlightened humanist perspective (even
the principle that mentions God
can be understood this way). For
him, the "good Lutheran candidate" is one who is wonder-awake,
has a love for subject and teaching,
is a continual learner, will advance
the kind of conversation we are
having, and has a sense of calling
(175). The hiring criterion of
willing participation in the conver-

sation is central, but it presupposes
that the institution already is
engaged in a conversation informed
by a theologically grounded epistemology. And having a sense of
calling, though rooted in the
central Lutheran concept of vocation, does not mean that a theological understanding of vocation
informs the candidate's concept of
vocation. "The truth is, the
successful integration of faith and
learning demands a certain level of
theological literacy and expertise,"
not just an endowed chair in the
religion department (188).
Although early on Christenson
affirms that "we are Lutheran
institutions by virtue of being
informed by a theologically shaped
anthropology and epistemology;
this shapes our approaches to
knowing, to teaching, to being a
community of learners" (29), the
implementation of this leaves
unclear whether Christenson
would
also
share
Gilbert
Meilaender's vision that "without
a distinctive commitment to transmitting a tradition, Christian
colleges have no particular reason
for existence." A Lutheran college
should not only have a theologically informed Lutheran epistemology, it should also facilitate
passing on what Mark Schwehn
refers to as a Lutheran or Christian
DNA, which can occur only by "a
critical mass of faculty members
who, in addition to being excellent
teacher-scholars, carry in and
among themselves the DNA of the
school, care for the perpetuation
of its mission as a Christian
community of inquiry, and understand their own callings as importantly bound up with the well
being of the immediate community." Without this transmission,
the "kind of conversation" we are
having will gradually change and

so will the ethos and epistemology
of the institution.
Christenson is not completely
opposed to a critical mass,
although he fears it means quotas.
In fact, Christenson captures an
essential feature of critical mass
when he contends that it is not
merely or even primarily a matter
of numbers, but also of position of
influence and quality: "If a
minority gets too small it becomes
token. I think the same could be
argued for Lutherans on the
faculty.... Having the right people
is important, but having them in
the right positions is also important. Even if a quarter of the
faculty in a university were
Lutheran, but no deans or
provosts or vice presidents or presidents were, it might be hard to
feel well-supported" (188-189).
This ultimately brings me back
to Christenson's Lutheran epistemology. Though the themes of sin,
faithful criticism, and paradox that
he notes in Luther clearly inform
his presentation, strangely the
theme of the Gospel as the foundation drops out from his discussion.
Notably, it is absent in the curricular suggestions, where the words
Gospel, theology, Lutheran, or
Christian do not appear. Likewise,
consideration of the Gospel does
not appear in his general education
scheme. The absence of the
Gospel, the DNA as it were, either
from the epistemic principles or
their application to curriculum and
community, needs to be overtly
attended to when implementing
Christenson's epistemology in the
academic community. This is not to
say that this DNA is not present in
Christenson's subtext, but as he
noted earlier in the book, the
Lutheran epistemology is not
distinctively Lutheran, so that
faculty and staff not informed by

this DNA could very well agree to
his pedagogical and community
recommendations without theological knowledge of, being rooted
in, or having a sense of continuity
with the tradition.
Community implementation of
Lutheran theology and epistemology, one might suggest, is part
of the Lutheran paradox; in being
an institution of the kingdom on
the left, it is possible to forget,
ignore, or even disenfranchise the
influence of the kingdom on the
right. So I would want to make
more explicit the role of the
Gospel as overtly informing the
institutional implementation of
Christenson's fertile Lutheran
epistemology. As Paul J. Griffiths
has put it, "[O]ne is a Christian
scholar [and here one might think
of being a Christian educator and a
Christian academic institution] if
one understands one's work to be
based upon and framed by and
always in the service of one's identity as a Christian."

Bruce Reichenbach

Stephanie Paulsell. Honoring the
Body-Meditations on a Christian
Practice. San Francisco: JosseyBass, 2002.
Stephanie Paulsell's book is the
third in the Practices of Faith
Series edited by Dorothy Bass
since 1997. This series grew out of
a Lilly-sponsored seminar on
'Practicing our Faith' in the midnineties. While deeply rooted
within the Christian tradition, the
series aims at a readership beyond
the Christian fold, a general audience concerned with human flourishing. Thus, the style of this book
is inviting, non-judgmental, and

non-technical, and the choices of
topics are of a general and very
basic existential nature.
The first volume of the series,
Practicing our Faith, carried a
contribution by Paulsell under the
same title as this book and she
raises there many of the same
themes of this monograph. But
shifts and changes are noticeable
here, indicating the author's
growing and broadening understanding of the subject. Paulsell
does not discuss her topic in a
theoretical manner, trying to prove
a hypothesis or to disprove others,
though she draws frequently on
the relevant literature. Instead, she
provides her readers with
'Meditations on a Christian
Practice.'
Her
associational
method and very personal style
(one third of the book consists of
autobiographical material!) are
quite appropriate. They indicate
personal authenticity, as does the
style, which now and then
becomes markedly passionate.
The nine chapters of the book
broadly follow the line of life from
birth to death. Interspersed is a
principal chapter on 'Pondering the
Mystery of the Body,' followed by
chapters on bathing, clothing, nourishing (with extended reflections on
'Blessing our Table Life'), exerting
and resting. A chapter on 'Honoring
the Sexual Body' and one on
'Honoring the suffering Body'
conclude Paulsell's meditations.
The opening chapter deals with
the
'Awakening to Sacred
Vulnerability,' which m the
author's case coincided with the
birth of her daughter. "My desire
for a practice of honoring the body
was awakened the day I crossed
the threshold of the hospital to the
world outside after the birth of my
daughter." Suddenly realizing how
vulnerable life is, the author took
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recourse in the Christian and
Jewish religious traditions "for
wisdom about the body," knowing
well that in the course of history
these traditions have often been
compromised. Perceiving the
human body as 'sacred' appears to
Paulsell especially helpful, for this
not only enables one to be mindful
of one's own body; it provides for
the qualitatively different attitude
toward others that the early
church displayed in her ministry of
charity. "These Christians knew
that what is suffered by one can be
suffered by all, and that every
body [!] is a fragile temple of
God's Spirit and worthy of care."
The tensions "between being a
body and having a body," as often
experienced in times of disease, or
"between integrity and relationality. . .freedom and constraint,
and between sacredness and
vulnerability" become pointers to
the body's own mystery. The
author resolves none of these
tensions. Instead, she encourages
her readers to accept them because
they help us "see the body as both
fragile and deeply blessed."
When
meditating
about
bathing, clothing, nourishing,
exerting and resting the body,
Paulsell's writing becomes noticeably more vivid. She often becomes
a passionate critic of the state of
affairs in today's society in order to
advocate significant changes
informed by religious traditions.
The chapter on bathing has a
section on baptism. The chapter on
clothing refers to the need for
clothing others found in Matthew
25:31-46, and, not surprisingly, the
chapters on nourishing cite the
Manna story and the Lord's
Supper. Finally, in the meditation
on 'Exerting and Resting the Body'
Paulsell presents the body as
created by God. It therefore bears

the image of God and is not to be
spoiled by overdoing exertion and
rest. God's rest on the seventh day
of creation and Jacob's sleep and
dream (Gen 28:10-17), like other
references, serve as critical markers
and call for the development of
practices that give honor to the
body alternative to practices
commonly accepted by our society,
such as fast food, shift-labor,
athletics, and lifestyle.
Paulsell's approach to sexuality
is remarkable. This chapter most
probably reflects her pastoral experience as a minister in the Christian
Church (Disciples of Christ) and as
director of ministry studies at
Chicago. Beginning with a personal
experience, she dwells on topics of
freedom and desire, ecstasy, the
evolving sexual self, consolation,
and covenant, employing scriptural
texts like 'Song of Songs,' Matthew
19:6, and others. "The sexual body
does not exist apart from the body
that eats and drinks, bathes and
dresses, rests and exercises and
works. Sexual desire does not exist
in isolation from other desires. It is
only through learning to honor the
body in every aspect of our
embodied life that we will be able
to honor our bodies' sexual feelings
and desires." What a perspective
for the development of wellgrounded sexual ethics!
Suffering and dying are meditated upon in the final chapter.
After briefly dealing with pain and
suffering, the author ponders
touch. Touch becomes a sign of
acceptance by others of the frail
and aching body. On the other
hand it reminds those willing to
care for the sick of their own
fragility and vulnerability. In linking
this argument to the word of the
risen Christ: "Touch me and see
me!" (Luke 24:39), Paulsell ends her
book with a pointed note on the

resurrection of the body (Rev 21:4),
which Christians anticipate in hope
and which finally informs all their
practices of honoring the body.
The book is stimulating and
liberating. It will serve ably the
purpose for which it was written,
providing ample material for
discussion, experimentation, and
pious reflection. The critical reader,
however, may notice a certain
dilemma, which the author too is
aware of but which she does not
really overcome. The dilemma is
caused by the wording of the
book's title: Honoring the body.
While the author tries her best to
avoid the implicit mate-rialism and
dualism by speaking of the "body's
own mystery" the body still
remains an object throughout. It is
seen as an instrument and tool to be
manipulated for the good, of
course as defined by religious tradition. But is that really the way it is?
'Bodies' are not just matter created.
Speaking of 'bodies' means always
speaking of 'lived bodies,' meaning
living human individuals with a
biography of their own. This
insight has a tremendous bearing
not only on the perception of the
self or the other-which today is
being reflected upon in disciplines
like philosophy, sociology, anthropology, medicine, psychology, and
biology. It also profoundly changes
perceptions of faith and faith traditions. Faith is never extra-corporeal. It is accessible only through
lived tradition (see Rom 10:14-17).
This calls for a complete revision of
theology and its articulations of
faith, which Paulsell's book does
not initiate. But it may be that
sometime in the future she will
come up with a contribution to this
effect. The potential to do so is
clearly there.

Christoffer H. Grundmann

Fritz Oehlschlaeger. Love and Good
Reasons: Postliberal Approaches to
Christian Ethics and Literature.
Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2003.
For readers interested in the mutual
relations of literature and ethics,
the last two decades have given rise
to both hope and despair. On the
one hand, books and articles
abound, unleashed in part by the
gradual yet ineluctable ascendance
of vanous politically-oriented
forms of literary scholarship (e.g.
feminist, marxist, postcolonial) and
especially their critique of the nineteenth-century notion of literature's 'disinterestedness.' While
this critique has rendered excellent
service to American intellectual life
in general and to the field of
literary criticism in particular, the
positive fruit borne of these movements has been decidedly mixed.
Ideological forms of theory tend to
produce accounts of literature that
are relentlessly reductivist (e.g.
literature is nothing but the excrescence of manipulative knowledgepower regimes), while ideological
criticism routinely effaces the
particular literary text in its efforts
to grasp and describe the socialhistorical world which lies behind
the text. Moreover, while these
literary-critical movements do
differ on a number of points, they
are remarkably similar with respect
to their undergirding ethico-political commitments. Each assumes
and advocates some rather clearly
conceived and doggedly pursued
form of liberalism in which
freedom from oppression is the
highest, and perhaps only, social
good and the social order is, generally, the passive or active opponent
of authentic individuation. Even
those few recent practitioners of
ethical criticism who do not fall

prey to the reductivist temptation
(e.g. Martha Nussbaum, Wayne
Booth) would gladly be called
liberals in this sense.
Thus the subtitle of Fritz
Oehlschlaeger's most recent book,
Love
and
Good
Reasons:
Postliberal Approaches to Christian
Ethics and Literature, says more at
first than it might appear to. On
the one hand, Oehlschlaeger
announces, through the term
'postliberal', his indebtedness to
Alasdair
Macintyre,
Stanley
Hauerwas, and, more generally,
the Yale school of theology for his
understanding of Christian ethics;
at the same time, he is also
announcing his intention to blaze a
new trail in the discussion of literature's relations to ethics by
departing from the broad and
well-worn path of literary critics
who espouse some form of ethical
or political liberalism. Chapter 1
begins with a survey of the landscape of recent efforts to reunite
ethical language with broadly
intellectual and narrowly literary
endeavors, and proceeds from an
appreciative critique of Mark
Schwehn's Exiles from Eden (in
which Oehlschlaeger argues that
Schwehn's position is both more
and less liberal than it purports to
be) to Booth's consideration of
texts as Aristotelian friends
(though Booth's liberalism keeps
him from appreciating the radical
communality of Aristotle's vision)
to J. Hillis Miller's deconstructive
ethics of reading (in which 'postmodern' appears to mean 'participating in the death throes of
liberal modernity') to Nussbaum's
neo-Aristotelian emphases on
moral vision and moral luck
(which emerge comparatively
unscathed). This chapter then goes
on to elaborate a distinctly
Christian vision of ethics from

which his reflections proceed; this
vision is formed primarily by such
postliberal figures as Hauerwas
and Macintyre, but also draws
substantially upon the work of
John Milbank, Simone Weil, Blaise
Pascal, and others. (Oehlschlaeger
even goes so far as to defend,
though not with out revision, this
position against the critiques of
Jeffrey Stout and Richard Rorty in
the book's afterword.)
Chapter 2 forms a transitional
chapter between the theoretical
first chapter and the literary-critical essays that follow. Here
Oehlschlaeger provides a close
reading of Melville's "Bartleby the
Scrivener" that reads Bartleby as a
figure for the moral bankruptcy of
intellectual life under the ideological tyranny of liberalism and
simultaneously demonstrates the
resistance a literary text can mount
to the ideological tyranny of liberal
critics. The most interesting feature
of this chapter to non-specialists
will be his argument for prudence
as a core virtue (second only to
charity) of postliberal Christian
intellectual life. Moving beyond
(and behind) the modern meaning
of 'prudence' as calculating reason,
Oehlschlaeger
rehabilitates
Aquinas' account of the central
moral virtue, helping us to see
prudence as a perceptive openness
to others, to things, to situations in
all the fullness of their particularity.
Chapters 3 through 6 are close
readings of the works of four
canonical authors Gane Austen,
Anthony Trollope, Henry James,
and Stephen Crane). Each of these
chapters has its own shining as well
as puzzling moments. Although
appearing unconnected, a common
structure is shared by the arguments of these four chapters. While
each chapter can and does stand on
its own, all offer a critique of
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abstract rationalism, especially
rationalism's efforts to domesticate
the embarrassing superfluity of
particulars which rich literary
narratives seek to celebrate.
Chapter 3 argues, through an
insightful and fair reading of
Emma, that Austen is "more
Protestant, feminist, and individualistic than Macintyre allows" (120).
Chapter 4 starts with Hauerwas'
provocative and perplexing claim
that "Karl Barth's main problem is
that he did not read enough
Trollope" (126), specifically that
Barth's account of honor in his
Doctrine of Creation traffics in
abstractions that are of little use to
concrete moral reflection. Through
a careful reading of Trollope's presentation of honor in The Warden
and He Knew He Was Right in light
of Barth's theological account of
that virtue, Oehlschlaeger demonstrates how the concrete details of
narrative and the abstractions of
philosophical
or
theological
discourse need one another to
remediate their own unavoidable
blind spots. Chapter 5 takes as its
starting point the austere theology
of Henry James Sr. and reads his
son's Portrait of a Lady as a narrative critique and counterstatement;
in so doing, Oehlschlaeger challenges Nussbaum's famous reading
of Osmond. Chapter 6, unlike the
others, does not begin with the
statement of an abstract thinker
whose claims subsequently come
under the scrutiny of narrative, but
his reading of Stephen Crane's
"The Blue Hotel" and "The
Monster" sets up an antagonism
between Crane's narratives, seen in
light of their allusive affinity with
the Gospel of John and Immanuel
Kant. Needless to say, Stephen and
John emerge victorious.
The inevitability of this last
match-up leads me to my only

significant criticism of an otherwise fine book. Immanuel Kant is
either explicitly or implicitly
present on nearly every page as the
whipping boy for postliberal
ethics. Now, truth be told, I too
have taken more than my fair share
of potshots at this venerable
philosopher. However, the implied
narrative
m
Oehlschlaeger's
account of modern ethics makes
Kant responsible for nearly every
problem in modern ethical and
political life: abstract rationalism;
disparagement of the body, history,
("modern
and
community
Gnosticism" as he calls it repeatedly); bureaucratic disregard for
personhood; and the list goes on.
Clearly he has inherited this prejudice from both Macintyre and
Hauerwas, but Oehlschlaeger
seems less than charitable in
repeating ad nauseum the postliberal line without engaging in any
direct conversation, as it were,
with Kant. Oehlschlaeger is sufficiently charitable to refrain from
nasty polemics or ad hominem
arguments, and he does have the
capacity
to
disagree
with
Hauerwas (chapter 4} and
Macintyre (Afterword) when
necessary, but his argument would
have been much better served by a
more direct encounter with Kant
than with the repeated evocation
of Kant's lurking, sinister presence.
The strengths of Love and
Good Reasons are many: It is wellwritten (and, thanks to Duke, welledited). Its analyses of literary texts
are careful, prudent (in Aquinas'
sense) and illuminating; in several
cases they offer a significant breakthrough in the critical literature. Its
summaries of Hauerwas in particular and postliberal theology in
general should be accessible to the
non-specialist and are, for the most
part, quite reliable. (One small

quibble here: In a few places
Oehlschlaeger seems to assume his
readers know more of Macintyre
than most of them will.) The most
significant accomplishment of this
volume, however, is its implicit
refutation of the charge, leveled by
Stout and others, that postliberal

Christian ethics must necessarily be
tribal, sectarian, or balkanizing.
Oehlschlaeger's project both
argues for and demonstrates how
robustly Christian scholarship
might serve not only the ekklesia
but also the polis without losing its
soul. Anyone interested in the

fields of literature and ethics, literature and theology, theology of
culture, or modern literary criticism would do well to spend time
with this well-written, insightful,
and provocative volume.
Scott Huelin
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by the waters of Mars: a bio-friendly universe?

Alan G. Padgett

LAST

NASA lAUNCHED TWO ROBOTIC
rovers toward the Red Planet. Sporting the upbeat
names Spirit and Opportunity, these Martian rovers
were sent primarily to study the rock formations of
our neighbor in space, with the hope of discovering
whether or not there is evidence of Martian seas
and flowing water. Last January, Spirit landed on
the Gusev crater, while Opportunity landed in the
Meridiani plain. After a rough landing, surrounded
by balloons, both rovers began to move out and
explore the planet. There is now conclusive
evidence that, yes, there once was liquid water on
the dry and barren plains of Mars. Opportunity, in
particular, has now found evidence of salt water
pools at least two inches deep, and NASA's Mars
exploration rover mission is not yet finished. No
doubt more evidence will turn up. What is more,
President Bush has announced a long range, $170billion proposal to send human prospectors to
Mars, looking for more ripply rocks.
Why all this excitement? What makes a little
salt in ripple patterns on a few rocks so profound a
discovery? The answer has to do with assumptions,
new assumptions the scientific community now
makes about life on other planets. We are
witnessing a paradigm sift in astrobiology.
At one time, scientifically minded philosophers
like Bertand Russell concluded that the physical
sciences have revealed a huge, empty universe filled
with darkness and devoid of life. Life on our planet
was an accident, a kind of cosmic hiccup. It is
almost ironic that we are endowed with intelligence
by a capricious nature, so this line of thought went,
for intelligence makes us capable of reflecting upon
the meaninglessness of our lives in comparison with
the gigantic span of the galaxies. It is impossible not
to recall the glorious rhetoric of Russell's most
cited essay, "A Free Man's Worship" (1903):
That Man is the product of causes which had
no prevision of the end they were achieving;
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
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fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the
outcome of accidental collocations of atoms;
that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of
thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the
labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of
human genius, are destined to extinction in
the vast death of the solar system, and that
the whole temple of Man's achievement
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris
of a universe in ruins-all these things, if not
quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly
certain, that no philosophy which rejects
them can hope to stand.
All that glorious angst in one sentence!
Russell's view has been continued by science
writers like Jacques Monod and Steven Weinberg.
Weinberg wrote in his book on the Big Bang that
"the more the universe seems comprehensible, the
more it seems pointless," since our tiny planet is
"one small part of an overwhelmingly hostile
universe."
We are now witnessing a sea change in the basic
assumptions about just how accidental and pointless life may be in our cosmos. Scientists working
on the Mars probe believe that wherever there is
liquid water and enough energy, there will be life.
The best scientific evidence for this new paradigm
in astrobiology comes not from space, but from the
wine-dark sea. Strange forms of life have been
found miles below the ocean's surface, where
cracks in the earth's crust shoot forth hot steaming
water ("dark smokers"). Various animals have
found a way to survive far beneath the sun's
enlivening rays, at the uttermost depths of the sea.
If life can evolve and survive there, then it may exist
in many different forms throughout our cosmos.
The universe may not be so dead and lifeless after
all. Life may not be an accident. In fact, many scien-

tists today hold that the universe is "bio-friendly."
NASA agrees. Where there is liquid water, and some

energy, life has a good chance of getting started.
One of the scientists at the forefront of this
paradigm-shift in astrobiology is the Belgian biologist Christian De Duve, winner of the Nobel Prize
in Medicine in 1974 for his work with cellular life.
Born in England in 1917, De Duve was professor of
molecular biology for many years at Rockefeller
University in Manhattan. In his so-called retirement, his books and lectures (such as Vital Dust or
Life Evolving) make the case for the evolution of
life being a natural occurrence: neither a supernatural miracle, nor an accident, but a normal
outworking of the laws of nature and the initial
conditions of the young earth. De Duve is part of a
growing cadre of scientists who believe all kinds
and types of life may well exist already, spread
throughout the vastness of space like salt in soup,
yeast in bread, or lamp stands in a room which
would otherwise be dark.
Of course, we are not yet talking about intelligent life. But if we do discover some evidence of

even microbial life on Mars, that will increase
greatly the odds that somewhere in our wonderful
universe, filled with light and life, there are bound
to be other creatures who are-like us-given the
gift of reason by the Creator of all. That life is an
accident, and the universe is pointless, uncaring,
and hostile-these assumptions are now seen for
the philosophy they always were. Russell and
Weinberg may think they are giving us "just the
facts, Ma'am," in setting forth a philosophy of
Stoic courage in the face a pointless existence.
Instead they are confusing their science and their
worldview, an error which usually leads to bad
philosophy and bad science. In fact, both
astronomy and biology are telling us that the
universe appears to welcome and encourage life,
which may already be blossoming around countless
stars just like ours.

f

Alan G. Padgett teaches theology and science at
Luther Seminary. He lives in a remote part of the
galaxy known as "Minnesota, " where he reports
there is lots of intelligent life.

THE SONS
Fog hides the heads of streets
and the sons who have fallen.
A strange vertigo makes them
think they are standing.
The gray muffles our calls;
they think us a species of bird
interpreting omens.
Tell it not in the valley
lest daughters of wantons rejoice.
0 daughters of God, now weepcry for the beautiful sons,
the fallen ones, sons
of Eli, of Saul.

Anne Turner

p1Uilipnlt aiOldl pew
front-page news
Thomas C. Willadsen

RCENTLY I READ AN ARTICLE ASKING, "WHAT

must the church do to get on the front page of the
newspaper?" Typically, churches do not make
headlines, and when we do it is because of scandals.
Earlier this year my church got some front-page
coverage in The Oshkosh Northwestern, so I know
the answer to the question about front-page news is
"Bury the locally notorious schizophrenic man."
It is, as they say, a long story.
Martin Lloyd was found dead on Wednesday
11 February. A friend of his had left some groceries
for him outside his door and after they had sat there
a few days, she feared the worst. When the police
entered his apartment they called the coroner.
Martin was a peculiar man. When I arrived in
Oshkosh five years ago I assumed he was homeless.
He looked like Bo Diddley, and acted and smelled
like the homeless people I had served while volunteering at a shelter in Chicago. It turned out,
though, that he had an apartment and frequented
my church. The outgoing interim pastor told me
that Martin knew more scripture than anyone else
in the congregation and it was true; he had many
verses memorized. Often during Adult Sunday
School and during less formal worship services he
would recite scripture-mostly psalms and epistle
passages-when he heard a word or phrase that
spurred his memory.
When I first spotted Martin at church I
assumed that he came just for the food we served
at coffee hour. Then I noticed he never once went
through the line himself. He would sit off to the
side and people would serve him.
"Martin, there are Oreos and chocolate chips
today, which would you prefer?"
"Fine, fine.
He also took his coffee "fine, fine."
Martin began to appear at our Wednesday
after-school program. He sat on a pew at the edge
of the room, just watching. At 5:30, when we make
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a circle holding hands and sing "Johnny
Appleseed," he would stay there, waiting. After a
few weeks, we moved the circle to surround
Martin, so he would have hands to hold during
grace. After a few more weeks the kids were vying
for the privileges of holding his hand and filling a
plate for him.
It seemed that everyone in town had somehow
touched-and been touched by-Martin Lloyd.
When I heard of his death I sprang into action. I let
the coroner know that we considered Martin a part
of our faith community, though he was not officially a member. I let the funeral home know that
we would plan a memorial service. We started to
track down Martin's next-of-kin.
Martin was seventy-nine years old. He had
grown up in Mississippi and had lived and worked
in Chicago before coming to Oshkosh. The friend
who had left him the groceries thought she knew
the name of an aunt somewhere in Mississippi. A
member of my church tried to contact the canning
factory in Chicago where Martin had worked. I
phoned the high school he had attended, but all our
leads were pretty lean. After a week, the coroner's
office called because Martin's mother had been
found, living in St. Louis! She, her daughter, her
grandson and his wife and their daughter would all
be coming to the memorial service.
Martin was notorious for several reasons. He
was often seen fishing at the river. He walked everywhere he went, always with either his fishing gear
or his guitar. His trademark, though, was the white
construction helmet he wore. All the time. He just
felt safer with it. After his death I learned how
proud he was of his background in construction.
He came to Oshkosh about fourteen years ago,
drawn by the Experimental Aircraft Association's
annual convention. A number of people here
befriended him. He had a community of people he
fished with; people who knew him from his

morning coffee at Hardee's; people whom he had
lunch with at the Salvation Army; the
Presbyterians. If everyone who ever bought him a
cheeseburger at Burger King had attended his
memorial service our church would have been as
full as on Christmas Eve.
Martin liked to travel. Every spring he went to
southern California and Mexico for about six
weeks. In 2002, he was gone for longer than six
weeks. People started to miss him; rumors
abounded. The Northwestern did an investigation.
Martin was found in a nursing home in Los
Angeles, having been beaten and robbed. The
community worked to bring him back to town. He
even got his old apartment back. (Martin lived
above a bar, which embarrassed him. Anyone who
gave him a ride home had to drop him off a block
away, and he would not begin walking home until
the driver had driven off.)
Planning the memorial service was a lot like
herding cats. We scheduled the service for a
Wednesday afternoon so the after-school kids
could attend. Most had never known someone
who had died. Since our liturgical dance group
practices on Wednesdays, they took part in the
service, as did our octogenarian blues harmonica
player-every church has one these days-who
played a medley of Mississippi delta blues tunes.
One of Martin's friends prepared a ten-page astrological reading for me. While I do not understand
the significance of zodiacal cusps, I was amazed to
learn that people with Martin's birthday are
expected to be wanderers who find it difficult to
settle any place and often drift from job to job.
Still, I found myself unable to use these insights in
my homily.
Two of Martin's fishing buddies paid for his
obituary. Employees from a printer who often had
lunch with Martin contributed the bulletins.
Someone else brought the flowers. We stretched

our Lenten Simple Supper Chili Feed and invited
members to bring salads and dessert for the
luncheon following the service. It wasn't the
miracle of loaves and fishes, but there was plenty of
food for everyone.
In addition to the front-page coverage of the
service, several things were especially gratifying to
me. I am very proud that the congregation I serve
and this community had been able to care for one
of our vulnerable people. Throughout the days
leading up to the service the line "guard each man's
dignity and save each man's pride" from "We Are
One in the Spirit" kept echoing in my head.
I think Martin's family did not realize how
precious Martin was to Oshkosh. They marveled at
the kindness that was shown to one his sister knew
as "a very eccentric young man."
Finally, memorial money poured in to the
church. Typically we have a formula which divides
memorials several ways, but in Martin's case the
congregation's ruling board decided to have all the
memorial money go toward purchasing a burial
marker which features a man fishing and a guitar,
and reads
Martin Lloyd
1924-2004

A Gentle Giant
The remaining money is in a fund that aids travelers stranded in Oshkosh. Now we are able to help
anyone in a situation like Martin's in Los Angeles.
Martin Lloyd's death and memorial service
were indeed front-page news in this town of 60,000.
But everyday, without the headlines, churches
extend kindness, compassion, respect, and grace to
eccentric, vulnerable people. And find themselves
blessed when a Martin Lloyd comes along. f
The Reverend Thomas C. Willadsen pastors First
Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.
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global Christianity still coming
Joel Carpenter

T.REE YEARS AGO I WROTE A PAPER ON TilE RISE
of new Christian universities in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America for a conference on "Currents in
World Christianity" hosted by the University of
Pretoria. Word of my interest in the subject spread
rapidly, and virtually every month since then I
learn of a new institution. Consider two recent visitors to my office. One was the Rev. Dr. Musiande
Kasali, a Congolese theologian who is a seminary
president in Nairobi, Kenya. "The Lord is calling
me to found a Christian university," he told me,
saying that it would most likely be in Beni, in the
trinityn Congo. I was astonished. Beni was the
epicenter of the brutal civil war in the Congo that
has claimed some 3.3 million lives since 1998. Dr.
Kasali explained: "We must rebuild our nation. We
need Christian leaders who will serve God's reign.
Surely we have seen enough of Satan's hand in our
land." One can hardly imagine a more impossible
place to build a Christian university, but Kasali and
his countrymen have heard God's call.
The other visitor was Dr. Young-nup Kim, the
academic dean of Handong Global University in
South Korea. Handong was founded in 1995 by a
Korean nuclear engineer who dreams of its
becoming an evangelical MIT. Handong is assembling a strong Korean faculty on a gleaming new
campus with about 3000 high-achieving students.
Handong is not content to stop there; it is busy
replicating itself in two other Asian sites:
Uzbekistan and Manchuria. Most American churchrelated colleges and universities worry about
spreading themselves too thin, so we shelve some of
our more ambitious dreams. That can hardly be
said of our non-western Christian counterparts.
This new wave of university building is driven
by the rising tide of world Christianity. The
Christian faith, which is in deep decline in Europe,
is on the ascent elsewhere. In 1900, eighty percent
of the world's Christians lived in Europe and
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North America. A century later, sixty percent of the
world's Christians are living in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. Whereas in Great Britain, for
example, only about one million of the 26 million
members of the Church of England attend on
Sundays, in Nigeria there are 17.5 million Anglicans
and their churches are packed for worship. Half of
the world's Anglicans now live in Africa.

T . E RISE OF NONWESTERN CHRISTIANITY HAS

come as a huge surprise to the secular west.
Historian Dana Robert points out that thirty years
ago, Christianity outside of the west was thought
to be a product of European imperialism, and it
was expected to wither and die in the post-colonial
era. As Robert wryly observes, one of the great
ironies of our times is that "the process of decolonization. . .freed Christianity to be more at home
in local situations." Nonwestern Christianity grew
much more rapidly after the end of the colonial
empires than during them. In 1900, there were only
about nine million Christians in all of Africa. A
half-century later, this number had tripled, to
about thirty million. Today, roughly a half-century
into the postcolonial era, the number has multiplied more than tenfold, to an estimated 382
million Christians in Africa.
Circling back to Drs. Kasali and Kim, we see
that they represent an intriguing facet of these
trends: nonwestern Christianity's growing investment in higher education. Three years ago, my
Pretoria paper pointed to six new evangelical
universities in Central America. In a visit to Costa
Rica last March, I found out that there were a halfdozen evangelical universities in San Jose alone!
Every month I learn of more such endeavors, from
Malawi to Haiti to Irian Papua. I converse regularly
with Christian leaders who, like Dr. Kasali, have
heard God's call to found a Christian university.

This movement marks an important stage in
the development of nonwestern Christianity. Like
the Methodist and Pentecostal movements of the
past, the new Christian groups arising in many
places are evolving from peace-disturbing, establishment-upsetting religious upstarts into settled
denominations and fellowships. With revival fires
no longer flaring and in need of some tending,
institutions or "fireplaces" are being built. There is
a rising generation to equip, and a surrounding
society in which to minister for the longer term.

L.

NEW CHRISTIANITY IS GROWING MOST

rapidly among the world's poor who, according to
sociologist David Martin, often become an
"aspiring poor." A university education and a good
job become worthy Christian aspirations, as does a
rising desire to save and serve troubled societies.
Early on, evangelical Christians tend to be preoccupied with evangelization and basic discipling of
new believers. As these movements grow and
prosper, however, expectations increase for them
to take on social responsibilities. Hear the mission
statement of a new Pentecostal school, Central
University College in Accra, Ghana. It aims to
advance "the great commission of our Lord Jesus
Christ in its multifaceted dimensions, ... to exhibit
His Kingdom ethics and to spread its justice and
righteousness in the world."
These new Christian universities give off
echoes of our own past. Nineteenth-century
Baptist and Catholic missionaries in the American
West founded new universities in such wild places
as the South Bend of the St. Joseph River in
Indiana, and on the banks of the Brazos in the
Republic of Texas. These "uncommon schools,"
according to historian Timothy Smith, sought to
relate the people's religious convictions to the
emerging political and social structures. The new
global Christianity is repeating this process.
So what do all of these developments have to
do with us Christian scholars in the North? For the
past millennium, Christianity and Christian
consciousness have been tied to Europe, and our
conversation here about Christianity and the life of

the mind bears the deep stamp of European
culture. As Christianity takes root in the south and
east, it is being transformed into a predominantly
nonwestern religion. Mrican Christian scholars, for
example, ardently claim Christianity as an Mrican
religion, not an import. That is the main point of
Kwame Bediako's stirring and provocative
Christianity in Africa: The Renewal of a NonWestern Religion (Orbis, 1995); and the main thrust
of Lamin Sanneh's eloquent new self-interview,
Whose Religion Is Christianity? The Gospel beyond
the West (Eerdmans, 2003).
If Christianity is becoming predominantly nonWestern, then what happens in Mrica, Asia, and
Latin America will have a growing influence on
what Christianity will be like worldwide.
Conversely, what happens in Europe and North
America will matter less. Says Tite Tienou, the West
Mrican theologian who now heads Trinity
Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield, Illinois,
"the future of Christianity no longer depends on
developments in the North."
Only a few years ago, such assertions would
have seemed vastly overblown, but the tragic events
of September 11 and the subsequent wars have
begun to awaken us to the global character of
contemporary life. One of the surprises is the religiosity of our present age. Peter Berger, formerly a
high priest of secularization theory, writes: "the
assumption that we live in a secularized world is
false." The assumption that 'modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion' has proven to be
mistaken. Globally interactive modernity has proven
to be a powerful vehicle for religious interaction and
competitive expansion, as traditional religious and
communal boundaries have broken down. The
rising Christianity of the south and east is no longer
distant or exotic. It is changing the whole church,
and we see signs that it will change our thought
world as well. I hope that the readers of Christian
thought journals like The Cresset will make new
efforts to ponder and act on the implications.

f

Joel Carpenter is Provost of Calvin College, Grand
Rapids, Michigan.

academic integrity from a faith perspective
Linda]ohnson

IN

EURIPIDES' PLAY, MEDEA, THE FEMALE PRO-

tagonist bemoans the fact that men bear no
outward, physical sign of the quality of their moral
character. One translation has it, "Oh, Zeus, why
have you given men clear marks to help them tell
the gold from counterfeit, while nature sets no
stamp upon men's bodies to help us tell the true
man from the false!" Neither men nor women have
an easy time discerning the character of those in
whom we would place our trust and affection. And
so, too, as a nation weary of scandal, with Medea
we might well wish for some outward sign by
which we could reliably recognize a trustworthy
corporate executive or political leader, one whose
integrity is without compromise.
Academic communities are hardly havens of
the honest. In college classrooms throughout the
country, academic dishonesty is pervasive. Surveys
conducted by the national Center for Academic
Integrity show that on most campuses, over
seventy-five percent of students admit to some
cheating, whether it is copying from a fellow
student's exam, using material from the Internet
without attribution in a research paper, or falsifying
research data. A particularly alarming trend is
evident in a 2001 survey of high school students
that found that more than half of the 4500 students
surveyed saw nothing wrong with cheating on tests.
It is not only students who stand convicted of
violating academic integrity, professors, themselves, have certainly engaged in plagiarism and the
falsification of data. The legal scholar, Stephen
Carter, has broadened the understanding of
academic dishonesty to include even the practices
associated with grade inflation and the hyperbole
characteristic of the recommendation letters we
write for our students. Candace De Russy, in the
Chronicle of Higher Education, even traces responsibility for corporate scandals and professionals'
dishonesty back to the declining standards for
academic integrity in college classrooms. It is the
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professors of undergraduates, she asserts, who
introduce students to a set of ethical standards
associated with a profession. "Do students learn by
observation," De Russy asks, "how a responsible
peer collegium conducts itself, both in disciplining
members who do not meet minimum standards
and in fostering the highest professional ideals?"
Without an experience of conducting their
work in a setting in which the highest ethical standards are practiced, students are ill-prepared to
embrace the ethical standards of their profession.
Indifference to matters of academic integrity, on
both the parts of students and professors, constitutes a fundamental threat to institutions like
ours-liberal arts colleges of the church-no less
that the declining academic preparation of students
or chronic financial constraints.
As stated in the academic integrity handbook
of the college where I teach, "Because academic
dishonesty in all its forms is so fundamentally
contrary to the community of study, because it is so
fundamentally destructive of the moral virtues
required of those engaged in the academic enterprise, we must collectively and individually reaffirm the central importance of the virtue of
academic integrity.... "
When one takes the fruits of another scholar's
research and writing without appropriate attribution,
or when one deliberately falsifies data, then one is
engaged in theft and has given false witness -violations of the seventh and eighth commandments. But
solely to recognize academic dishonesty as sin is
insufficient and unlikely to diminish the frequency of
its occurrence in a college community. Are there
resources that people of faith bring to the project of
restoring integrity to our college communities?
In Romans 12:2, the apostle Paul urges people
of faith not to be conformed to this worldconformed to a world in which theft and false
witness have become commonplace-but to be
transformed by the renewal of our minds, that we

may discern the will of God. In his exploration of
the meaning and implications of the commandments, Martin Luther explains that the commandments address not only that which is prohibited but
also that which we must do. Luther says that not
only must we not steal that which belongs to our
neighbors, we must offer our neighbors assistance
to improve and protect that which is theirs. We are
not merely warned against slandering or betraying
our neighbor, but obligated to safeguard them
against harm by others. Seen through the lenses of
Luther's commentaries, we are obligated not only
to refrain from dishonesty, but also to strengthen
the learning community by aiding each other in
"the renewal of our minds, that we may discern the
will of God."
Luther's explanations of the seventh and eighth
commandments cause us to reflect on the broader
implications of violating academic integrity. A
teacher who must attend to the possibility that a
paper has been plagiarized and must search for its
sources has less opportunity to assist other students
in the refinement of their thinking. And when a
teacher awards higher grades than a student's work
merits, the teacher fails to respect the students'
pursuit of their Christian vocations and makes of
their work a smaller, less important thing. The
integrity of the academy requires not only the practice of virtues-fair mindedness, courage, perseverance, intellectual humility, and empathy-but also
our commitment to creating a learning community
in which, as students and teachers, we support each
others' vocations as scholars.
If we are not to be conformed to this world, but
transformed, we must envision the learning
community and our roles as students and teachers
in a new way. To conform to this world is to interpret the academy in light of the values and practices
of the market and think of our learning as a product
with solely extrinsic value. With a transformed
vision of the learning community, we understand
ourselves to be engaged in a spiritual project-we
understand our intellectual inquiry as a form of
Christian witness. In contemporary American
society, we have all but lost the memory that the
medieval origins of the university were in the cathedral. Michael Peterson, analyzing the thought of the
Christian philosopher, Jacques Maritain, has
described the teacher's role as a "ministerial agent
in the educational process. . .mediators of something that is higher than themselves, helping others

to acquire not only facts and skills but also the
dispositions and qualities suitable for rational
beings [made] in the image of God." In the transformed vision of the learning community, learning
is understood to have intrinsic value as a "renewal
of our minds, that we may discern the will of God."
A transformed vision of the learning community demands a broader set of expectations. Parker
Palmer, who writes compellingly about the vocations of teaching and learning, has observed
another sense in which being conformed to this
world diminishes a learning community. He
observes that "our culture's fearful obsession with
results has sometimes, ironically, led us to abandon
great objectives and settle for trivial and mediocre
ends. The reason," Palmer states, "is simple. As
long as 'effectiveness' is the ultimate standard by
which we judge our actions, we will act only
toward ends we are sure we can achieve."
My college transcript states that I majored in
history, but it would be more accurate to say that I
majored in Armajani, a professor with whom I
studied at every opportunity. Professor Armajani
was born and raised in Iran and educated at university and seminary in the United States. At the
beginning of every course, every semester, in an
accent thick with his native language of Farsi,
Armajani would intone the same three questions:
What is good? What is evil? And what is [hu]man?
For Armajani, the study of history was sustained
reflection on the moral dimensions of human experience. He instilled compassion for the people
whom we studied and a sense of urgency to do
justice in the world. Beyond the skills of analysis
and interpretation, I believed I was learning something like wisdom. He made me feel that I was a
member of a continuing community of memory
and exploration-probing the questions of
enduring value that constitute the core of our intellectual being.
As teachers it is our calling to invite students to
join this community of discernment, for us to make
it as attractive and worthwhile as we know it in our
bones to be. Ultimately, the resource people of
faith bring to this task is the resolve not to be
conformed to a diminished world but by the
renewal of our minds to transform our learning to
the wholeness born of wisdom.
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Linda Johnson teaches History at Concordia
College, Moorhead, Minnesota.

art and law: a Viennese tale
Edward McGlynn Gaffney

I

Will NEVER FORGET MY CHANCE ENCOUNTER

with Maria Altmann. It was at a Christmas party. I
introduced myself to the elderly woman. Talk
turned to Austria and I learned that she had been
born in Vienna, but had lived in the U.S. since 1942.
We spoke of art, of the painter Gustav Klimt, and
my favorite Klimt-a painting of a woman with
black hair tied up in a pompadour. Her hair is the
only darkness in the whole painting. Kind of the
reverse of Caravaggio or Rembrandt. Lots of
chiaro, not much oscuro. Everything else-her
gown, the jewels, the background-is a shimmering gold. It's a stunning portrait.
"That woman is my aunt, Adele Bloch-Bauer.
That painting belongs to me," Maria Altmann
replied. "The Nazis stole it from my uncle's home
in 1939, and the Austrians won't give it back."
Maria Altmann, I learned, had survived the Shoah
by fleeing Austria after the Anschluss in March of
1938. Her uncle Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy
Viennese merchant also had fled, escaping first to
Czechoslovakia, and then-when Chamberlain let
"honorable Mr. Hitler" have the Sudetenland-to
Switzerland, where he died penniless in 1945.
Soon after we met, Maria hired a very good
lawyer, Randol Schoenberg, the grandson of two
world-famous Viennese composers, Arnold
Schoenberg and Eric Zeisl. For several years
Schoenberg has ably represented Altmann in her
legal battle to wrest from the Austrian government
six Klimts that her uncle Ferdinand left to her in his
1945 will. The painting of her aunt Adele was
among these. In 1999 an Austrian journalist notified
Altmann of his discovery of documents that demonstrate the falsity of the Austrian Gallery's claim that
her aunt and uncle had given the paintings to the
gallery before the Anschluss in March of 1938.
Altmann then tried to recover the paintings from the
gallery, but the museum officials would not budge.
The option of pursuing a legal remedy in
Austrian courts is not a realistic one for Maria
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Altmann. Austria demands a bond pegged to the
current market value of the paintings, now estimated at over $150 million. So, on her behalf,
Schoenberg filed a lawsuit in the federal trial court
in Los Angeles.
The Austrian Gallery, owned and operated by
the Republic of Austria, raised the defense of sovereign immunity to the litigation. Both the trial court
and the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument and ordered the case to
proceed to trial on the merits of Altmann's claims.
Austria sought review in the United States Supreme
Court, which took the case and heard arguments
on 25 February of this year. The Court is expected
to rule in this case by the end of the current term
in June of 2004.
In its legal brief, Austria confidently asserts
that the paintings are "owned by the Republic."
This misleading statement ignores the very heart of
this litigation, for Altmann maintains that these six
paintings are in fact hers, and are "in the wrongful
possession of the Republic of Austria and the
Austrian Gallery." Possession may be nine points of
the law, but it is not the same as clear title or
rightful ownership.

I

F THE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS THIS CASE TO GO

to trial, I am confident that Altmann will be able
to demonstrate that the paintings were not
"given" to the gallery by a "bequest" in the 1923
will of Adele Bloch-Bauer and were certainly not
"given" to Austria in the 1945 will of her husband
Ferdinand, that the art was in fact stolen by the
Nazis in 1939 and came into the possession of the
Austrian Gallery at various times after 1939; that
the retention of the paintings after the war was
achieved through shameless extortion by Austrian
officials to induce a surrender of valuable property rights by the lawyer representing the
Altmann family; and that the Austrian govern-

ment is guilty of an ongoing deception about
these facts.
At this point, however, the Court must focus
on a narrower legal question that has enormous
significance for Holocaust-era claims lodged
against an agency of a foreign government: does an
American federal court have power to hear a
complaint of theft that occurred before 1952? In
that year, an official in the State Department
announced that the United States had abandoned
the view that sovereign immunity is absolute, and
in 1976, Congress codified this view in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act, which confers on federal
courts power to reject the defense of sovereign
immunity in cases in which a plaintiff sues a foreign
government that has expropriated property (or, as
in this case, has retained property taken in violation of international law). If the Court answers this
question in the negative, no suits for recovery of
stolen property from the 1930s and 1940s will be
allowed in federal courts.

I

CAN ALMOST UNDERSTAND mE AUDACnY OF

Austria, which prizes these beautiful paintings so
much that it claims absolute sovereign immunity,
even in a case seeking restitution of art stolen by the
Nazis. But I am shocked that the Bush
Administration has decided to support Austria in
this case. The amicus brief filed by the Justice
Department overlooks the insistence of our government-from the London Declaration of 1943 to the
present moment-that art stolen by the Nazis must
be restored after the war to its rightful owners.
Worse yet, its legal argumentation is formalistic and
ahistorical. Hence, I have filed a brief reframing the
issues the Court must resolve. On behalf of several
prominent Holocaust historians and art historians,
my amicus brief argues that Austria's reliance upon
absolute sovereign immunity is misplaced.
First, the theft of the Klimt paintings must be
viewed within the larger context of the crime of
genocide perpetrated by German and Austrian
Nazis. Why do I insist on this connection? Because
the Nazis themselves made this connection in the
darkest criminal conspiracy of the past century.
The dispossession of Jews was linked directly to an
intentional plan to rob Jews of their liberties and
their very lives by the millions.
The very language of homicide had to be reinvented to describe the enormity of state-sanctioned

moral depravity in the twentieth century. In 1944,
Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish refugee from Poland
teaching at Yale Law School, invented the term
"genocide" because, he said, "New Conceptions
require new terms." He defined genocide as "the
destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. . .a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves."
A year later, the Treaty of London addressed
two distinct crimes-war crimes and crimes against
hum-anity-that guided the International Military
Trib-unal at Nuremberg. As Justice Robert Jackson,
Chief Prosecutor for the United States before this
tribunal, argued, the theft of Jewish property by the
Nazis fits within the larger pattern of massive criminality comprehended under the terms, "genocide,"
"war crime," and "crime against humanity." The art
theft at the heart of the Altmann case can only be
comprehended in the context of the pattern of
gross violation of the dignity of Austrian Jews that
led ultimately to their forced deportation to outside
countries (as was the case with Maria Altmann and
her uncle Ferdinand) or to brutal slave labor camps
such as those at Mauthausen (where over 119,000
prisoners, including over 38,000 Austrian Jews,
were tortured and killed by being worked to death)
and finally to the death camps in Poland, notably
Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest Jewish cemetery in
the world (where victims arrived in cattle cars and
left this world in chimneys).
Second, federal courts most emphatically do
have plenary jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and its fruits. No nation enjoys sovereign
immunity from this crime, any more than it would
from acts of piracy, terrorism, or engaging in
slavery. The Nazi seizure of property owned by
Jews was, in the language of the United Nations
Genocide Convention, "deliberately inflicting on
[a national, ethnical, racial or religious] group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." It trivializes
the painful history of the Shoah for Austria to rely
in this day and age upon the doctrine of international law that places its conduct beyond the reach
of law because it is an "act of a state" or for the
Justice Department to read the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act in such a wooden, acontextual way.
Third, the position adopted by Austria and the
Bush Administration ignores critical developments
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in international law and in the history of Europe,
and more particularly in the history of Austria, that
undermine the claim of sovereign immunity.
A. Every treaty is a voluntary renunciation of
sovereignty over the terms of that treaty. Hence,
when Austria ratified the Hague Convention on the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) , it
implicitly renounced its claim to sovereign immunity in cases involving the confiscation of private
property (forbidden by Article 46), pillage
(forbidden by Article 47), and "all seizure of.
works of art" (forbidden by Article 56).
B. Austria abandoned the general theory of
absolute sovereign immunity in the 1920s. In 1950
its own Supreme Court ruled that a foreign state
may not avoid responsibility for violations of international law by invoking sovereign immunity.
C. In conformity with the London Declaration of
1943 (repudiating dispossession of civilians during
wartime), the post-war government of Austria officially repudiated all transactions in the property of
Nazi victims, declaring them null and void in three
separate statutes passed in 1946 and 1947 that were
designed to accomplish restitution of Nazi-looted
property.
D. When Austria sought to rejoin the family of
nations as an independent nation in 1955, it
pledged again in its State Treaty to restore all unreturned Nazi-looted property.
E. After intense negotiations, the Clinton administration convened a major international conference
in Washington in December 1998 about restitution
of Nazi-looted art. At this conference Austria
announced that it had just enacted federal legislation to enforce this duty of restitution, and it
described to the other forty-three nations at the
conference its laudable efforts to catalog confiscated art in its state museums and to return them to
their rightful owners. Austria has settled a major
dispute with the Rothschild family, restoring to
them more than 250 treasures that the Nazis had
looted and that Austria had retained as part of its
"national cultural heritage" for decades.

A

I hope the Court does not exalt legal
formalism in the manner urged by the Justice
Department. No country should profit from
avoiding its responsibility to return Nazi-looted art
to those from whom it was stolen or to their
surviving heirs. To accept the view of the current
administration-a position no previous administration has ever adopted-severely erodes the duties,
now widely acknowledged in the art world, both to
search carefully for the provenance of art in the
years from 1933 to 1945, and, where it becomes
clear that the art was stolen by the Nazis, to return
it promptly to its rightful owners. It sends a double
message to Austria and other nations about postShoah morality: "Please return stolen art to its
rightful owners. But if you like this art a lot, or if
you find it to be 'art of national significance,' or if
keeping this art will help attract tourists to your
capital, by all means keep it, and we'll find a way
of making sure that no one can use our courts to
establish whether it belongs to you or not."
Far from interfering with the foreign policy of
this country, allowing federal courts to serve as fora
for redress of grievances arising from the
Holocaust era enables such claims to be resolved
judiciously and in conformity with the rule of law
and the freedoms espoused and championed by
this country when it undertook its titanic struggle
in World War II against Fascism.
Finally, this case is about more than priceless
art treasures. As Elie Wiesel, one of the most vivid
witnesses to the Shoah, has written: "The duty to
remember covers not only big accounts, huge
palaces, and rare art collections but also less
wealthy families, small merchants, cobblers,
peddlers, school teachers, water carriers, beggars;
the enemy deprived them of their pathetically poor
possessions, such as a prayer book, a shirt, a comb,
eyeglasses, toys. In other words: the poor victims
were robbed of their poverty." By allowing the
Altmann case to proceed on its merits, the Supreme
Court would fulfill a moral obligation to remember
all these victims of the greatest crime of the twentieth century. As painful as the burden of this
memory may be, we dare not forget.

f

OF THESE C.ONsiDERATIONS LEAD TO THE

conclusion that Austria may not now be heard to
claim absolute sovereign immunity in a case seeking
restoration of Nazi-looted art to Maria Altmann.

Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., teaches law at
Valparaiso University. For a full copy of his brief in
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, contact him at
edward.gaffney@valpo.edu.

the chase
A.P
«J will follow him around the Horn, and around the Norway maelstrom, and around

perdition's flames before I give him up." -Captain Ahab, Moby Dick

IN

THE FILM ThE

ROCK, NICHOLAS CAGE PLAYS AN
FBI agent who commandeers a sports car, zips in
and out of oncoming traffic, and purposely drives
the vehicle through the glass windows of a
building, all in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. I know
I'm not telling the readers of this journal anything
they don't already know when I say that such a
pursuit is purely cinematic and any law enforcement officer in this day and age would get fired
twenty times over for attempting such stunts.
(Although there is part of me that has always
wanted to hold out my badge and commandeer
something. Anything. Even if just a Big Wheel).
So what are the actual rules of engagement for
a vehicle chase? They differ slightly from department to department, but here's what I can tell you
about my neck of the woods. First off, chases aren't
that common. Even an active officer might only get
into a few pursuits a year. But when a driver flees,
it's usually because of one or more of the following
conditions: (1) The driver of the fleeing vehicle is
in a stolen car. (2) The driver has multiple arrest
warrants. (3) The driver is drunk. (4) There are
items in the car the driver does not want discovered (guns, drugs, plagiarized term papers).
Chases can be touched off in a number of
different ways (e.g., a traffic stop, recognizing a
felony suspect behind the wheel, etc.), but the
bottom line is, you've turned on your squad's lights
and siren and the vehicle you are following isn't
pulling over. Okay. It's game on. This is the
promise of excitement that lured you onto the
force. This is why your little brother still thinks
you're sort of cool.
The first part of a chase is the radio broadcast.
The pursuing officer gets on the air and tells the
dispatcher what's going on. If you are solo, driving
while broadcasting is a difficult feat. It's like trying
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to read two books at once. If you have a partner,
that person will broadcast and the driver will
concentrate on driving. The key to broadcasting is
to remain calm. The tendency is to talk fast on the
air, because you're excited and traveling at high
speeds. But the best broadcasts are confident and
pithy, yet affectless-like you're ordering breakfast
or inquiring about which films may be showing at
the multiplex. Basically, you want to sound like
Tom Brokaw. A solid broadcast might go something like this:
Officer: "Squad 80 for the air."
Dispatcher: "Go ahead, Squad 80."
Officer: "I'm in vehicle pursuit northbound in the
1800 block of N. King St. four-door white Ford
Taurus with plates of William George Tom Four
One Seven. One white male occupant."
Dispatcher: "What is the reason for pursuit, 80?"
Officer: "The car is refusing to pull over for a
traffic stop. We're still northbound on King St,
approaching Center. Speeds at about forty mph.
Traffic is light. Road conditions are good."

My departmental policy states that only two
police vehicles may be involved in a chase, in order
to minimize chaos and accidents. The unit directly
behind the fleeing vehicle is primary and the other
unit is secondary. Let me be frank. There are never,
ever, just two police cars in pursuit. Cops thirty
blocks away are tossing their double cheeseburgers
and shakes out the window and roaring out of the
drive-through to get in on the action. Everybody
wants a piece of the pie.
In the initial stages of the chase, an officer will
run the plate of the fleeing vehicle. We want to
know where the car lists to, because that may be
where the fleeing suspect is heading, somewhere
familiar where he can ditch the car and run. But

plates often don't list to vehicles. Some folks think
nothing of stealing a plate and putting it on their
own car, so the license on that 2003 Cadillac
Escalade you're after may in fact list to an '81
Dodge Dart. Rats. Running the plate will also tell
you if the car is stolen (unless it's a fresh steal that
hasn't been reported yet).
So the chase continues, through alleys and
parking lots and sometimes over front lawns, as
other cars lurch out of the way like frightened
cattle. The pursuing officer continues to broadcast
the direction of travel of the fleeing vehicle and
also tries to keep an eye on the driver to see if she
tosses any contraband out the window. In the squad
car, due to the stress and kinetic charge of the
chase, colorful language is usually bandied about.
Here are some techniques criminals use to try
and shake their pursuers:
The Stop and Go. At some point during the
chase, the car will pull over, as if the driver is
conceding defeat. If the officers then get out and
approach, the driver will take off again, counting
on the head-start he now enjoys as the officers run
back to their squad to give chase.
The Leap of Faith. The driver will jump out of
the car and stagger away while the car is still
moving at low speed, in hopes that the officers will
have to stop the moving car from causing an accident instead of giving chase on foot. Incidentally,
there is a traffic ticket solely designed to handle
desperados like this. The ticket is called Alighting
from Moving Vehicle, is quite pricey, and is an
absolute delight to hand out.
The Dip and Pray. The driver turns the corner,
immediately parks, turns the car off, and ducks
down in hopes that the cops will fly right by. If it
works, the driver can get away, chortling at her own
cleverness. If it doesn't work, she's a fly in the web.

I

N A CHASE, THE BAD GUY GENERALLY HAS THE

upper hand. He probably has some idea where he's
going and action always beats reaction, so the
pursuing cops are always playing catch-up. And the
driver probably doesn't hold the same regard for
life and property that the pursuing officers do, so
he'll zip through a red light without a second's
thought or scream by that scout troop about to
cross the street. The bad guy also has an advantage
because in many municipal departments, a
pursuing officer may not fire a weapon at the

fleeing vehicle (unless under exigent circumstances), ram the vehicle, or use spike strips to
deflate the tires of the vehicle. Where's the fun in
that?, you may wonder. Well, it is the city, after all.
Too much traffic, too many people, too many
things that could go wrong. Better to chill a little.

W.nu

THE cHASE coNTINUEs, A POLICE

supervisor, typically a sergeant, is listening in on
the radio. The supervisor weighs the prospect of
catching the bad guy against the danger posed to
the public by all these cars racing through the city.
The supervisor knows that chases have ended in
horrific accidents where police officers are killed
when they smash into each other, or some pedestrian is struck so hard by the fleeing vehicle that he
is literally knocked out of his shoes. If the police
nab the bad guy but in doing so, two cops have
ruptured discs in their backs from a crack-up and
the fleeing driver ends up running his car through
somebody's living room, maybe the community
wasn't well served by the chase.
So if the chase gets too out of hand, and especially if there's a chance the driver can later be
identified, a supervisor may cancel the pursuit.
That means that even if the suspect car is still right
in your sights, you have to pull over and disengage.
Despite cancellation of a pursuit often being the
wise, practical decision, street cops hate it. That's
when the clicking starts. Clicking is when disgruntled officers, either the pursuing officers or officers
just listening in, key their radio mike multiple times
in rapid succession, generating a clicking sound.
The clicking is a sign of disapproval akin to booing.
If you, the reader, are thinking that clicking sounds
a bit childish and unprofessional, well, you're
right. It's also dangerous, because officers can't
hear anything when the mike is being keyed, so any
calls for help on the radio will go unheard until the
clicking stops. I don't know if clicking is a nationwide phenomenon. I don't know when or where it
started. I don't know how to stop it.
If the pursuit is not cancelled and the suspect
vehicle finally comes to rest after the chase, a
couple of things might happen. The driver and any
passengers may flee on foot. Or they may stay put
because there are a hundred cops behind them. If
they stay, the police are supposed to do what's
called a felony stop. This is a practiced, tactical
maneuver involving at least two squad cars parked

at certain angles, several officers covering down on
the vehicle with shotguns, and an officer on the PA
ordering the suspect or suspects out of the vehicle
step-by-step in a series of rehearsed commands. But
human nature being what it is, instead of the felony
stop, typically what you get is the blue swarm; a
wave of cops with their guns out immediately
converging on the suspect's car, running up on top
of the hood, yanking the driver out through the
door or window, their adrenaline so spiked that
they can't wait, like a kid who tears open his presents a week before Christmas.
The aftermath of a pursuit involves an obscene
amount of paperwork (the criminal charge is called
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Fleeing and is a felony), and media coverage (there
is something blood-stirring and eminently watchable about car chases, and the local news gobbles it
up}. As the pursuing officers decompress from a
successful chase, a deep sense of satisfaction settles
in. After all, the quarry has been hunted down
through the maelstrom and around perdition's
flames, with minimal damage to people and cars.
The white whale is in handcuffs now, his head
bowed, his vehicle on the back of a tow truck.
Somewhere, Captain Ahab is smiling.

f

A.P. wrote this column mostly as an excuse to use
the phrase "perdition's flames."

tthnml g§ cattth0linc
Martin Luther and Mother Teresa
]ennifer Ferrara

I

According to Zaleski, the doubt described by
NO WNGER HAVE THE CONCERN FOR 1HING5
Mother Teresa is a modern version of the dark
Lutheran I once had, but I read with interest
Martin Marty's essay "Writing Martin Luther" in
night of the soul. In past centuries, mystics went
the Epiphany/Lent issue of this journal. In particthrough periods during which they believed God
had reprobated them. In modern times, the dark
ular, I was fascinated by his assertion that Luther's
night of the soul has taken "the form of radical
message is assumed by many to be no longer reledoubt, doubting not only one's state of grace, but
vant to most Christians: "[Luther's] constant
God's promises and even God's existence."
themes that offer variations on the cantus firmus,
This radical form of doubt is, it seems to me,
the foundation, namely justification by grace
the main spiritual problem of our time. Marty is
through faith, can sound like solutions that are
useless because they address problems people of
right that most people are not plagued by feelings
of guilt. (Whether or not they should be is a
today are not expected to have." In other words,
most people today are no longer
different issue). However, people do
suffer from feelings of doubt, meantormented by feelings of guilt or
The idea that our inglessness, and loneliness. These
fears of hell. Luther's insecurities,
doubts, even of
which lie behind his theology, are not
feelings are the modern form of
God's existence,
our insecurities. Therefore, his
despair. As a pastor, I tried to
address this problem within the
message that we are justified by grace
can ultimately
through faith falls on deaf ears.
Lutheran law/gospel framework.
bring us closer to
I agree with Marty that the spirFollowing the Lutheran confessions,
Him was nothing I viewed despair as a form of sin
itual landscape has changed since the
short of a spiritual (Luther's Smalcald Articles call it a
time of the Reformation. His article
revelation to me.
reminded me of another-Carol
fruit of original sin) to which the
Zaleski's "The Dark Night of
answer was the promise of God's
forgiveness. However, the solution did not seem to
Mother Teresa" in First Things. Zaleski argues that
fully fit the problem.
Mother Teresa is a saint for our times because she
My study of the mystics has led to a different
suffered from the fears and doubts of our age. For
understanding and approach to the problem of
this reason, she can teach us something about how
despair, one with a long tradition in the Catholic
to cope with modern spiritual problems.
Though we know Mother Teresa primarily
Church, yet one which is perhaps more relevant for
through her ministry to the poor and dying, she
the modern age. From the mystics, I have learned
was a mystic who suffered from a "true dark night
that despair can be an integral part of one's faith.
Zaleski says, "Mother Teresa learned to deal with
of the soul" for most of her adult life. For two
years when she was in her thirties, she experienced
her trial of faith. . .by converting her feeling of
a profound union with Christ. But for the rest of
abandonment by God into an act of abandonment
her whole adult life, she suffered from the loss of
to God. It would be her Gethsemane, she came to
believe, and her participation in the thirst Jesus
all spiritual consolations. In her letters, she
describes "that terrible pain of loss of God not
suffered on the Cross. And it gave her access to the
wanting me, of God not being God, of God not
deepest poverty of the modern world: the poverty
really existing."
of meaninglessness and loneliness."

The idea that our doubts, even of God's existence, can ultimately bring us closer to Him was
nothing short of a spiritual revelation to me. As it
turns out, I heard this thought articulated for the
first time during a particularly spiritually arid time
in my life-the period after which I had left the
Lutheran Church but had not yet entered the
Roman Catholic Church. I could no longer pray.
God seemed distant at best. During this time, I
went on a retreat at the Sisters of Life Convent in
the Bronx. There a priest talked about the theology
of the great mystic and doctor of the Church, St.
Teresa of Avila. I hadn't wanted to go on the retreat
(a friend dragged me along), and I certainly wasn't
in a frame of mind to encounter new ideas. I had
sunk deep into spiritual darkness and was getting
rather used to it.
I remember little of the talk: the ideas were so
new to me, I couldn't take them all in. But I took
away the knowledge that God was allowing me to
undergo a period of purgation-a time of spiritual
purification. From St. Teresa, I learned that times of
despair can serve such a purpose. I do not mean to
compare my life to that of the great mystics, but to
show how their insights into the meaning of
suffering and despair can help us make sense of our
own. The key is how one looks at the problem of
despair. As a Lutheran, I viewed doubt as the opposite of faith. As a Catholic, I understand it to be an
occasion for faith. The great nineteenth-century
mystic, St. Theresa of Lisieux was able to say, "Do
not believe I am swimming in consolations; oh, no,
my consolation is to have none on earth."
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Obviously, for some people who have no faith,
despair is just that. However, for those who have
even a glimmer of faith, despair can become a
source of hope. When turned over to God and
offered up for his good purposes, despair becomes
meaningful, and, on some level, ceases to be despair.
Richard Neuhaus, in his review of Marty's
book in First Things, says of Martin Luther, "Few
Christian thinkers have so well understood the
abyss of despair that is the alternative to the utterly
gratuitous love of God in Christ." The nature of
the abyss has changed for many Christians; the
answer of God's grace has not. Modern mystics
offer a way of making that grace relevant to the
problems of today. Feelings of meaninglessness,
loneliness, and doubt properly understood move
us toward union with God. There is a dark
knowing and a dark loving and, as Mother Teresa
demonstrated, we can carry on in the midst of
them, hopeful that the darkness will one day give
way to light. Faith is sometimes a matter of hanging
on to that light no matter how dim its glow,
knowing that through our sufferings we are participating in Christ's agony on the cross. From
Mother Teresa, we learn that faith is sometimes
strongest when it appears the weakest. This is a
message for our time.

f

Jennifer Ferrara, a formerly ordained minister of the
ELCA, is a Roman Catholic laywoman. She is coeditor of The Catholic Mystique: Fourteen Women
Find Fulfillment in the Catholic Church (Our
Sunday Visitor, 2004).

the fate of marriage in America
Robert Benne

I,

IT DISCRIMINATION TO REFUSE GAY AND LESBIAN

couples access to the social institution of marriage?
Is that refusal unfair and unjust? Those seem to be
the pressing questions that more and more judges
are answering in the affirmative. Indeed, it seems
that many urban centers in America are poised to
strike down as impermissible discrimination the
age-old requirement that marriage must be a union
of a man and a woman. Could the whole of Western
history and society have been wrong in limiting
marriage to the union between male and female?
the history of marriage law
The answers to those questions depend on
what is meant by marriage and rights. Take
marriage; it is abundantly clear that historical
precedent weighs universally on the side of the
male-female requirement. (So argues John Witte,
Jr. in his fine volume From Sacrament to
Contract-Marriage, Religion, and Law in the
Western Tradition. Much of what follows is gleaned
from that book.) Marriage in the West was defined
by the Early Church over against Roman practice.
It relied on Jesus' reaffirmation of the Genesis texts
that Adam and Eve should become one-flesh in an
exclusive, life-long union. The Catholic Church
developed a theology of marriage by the third
century and fully systematized it in the eleventh to
thirteenth centuries. That theology was embodied
in canon law, which regulated marriage for all the
Christian societies of the West. Marriage had
natural, contractual, social, and religious dimensions that were articulated theologically and
legally. In the Catholic tradition marriage was an
indissoluble sacrament. Couples could separate on
the basis of adultery or desertion but they could
not divorce. The entrance to marriage was carefully guarded by a long list of impediments that
insured that both the man and the woman were fit
for marriage. The Catholic tradition also set the

classic goals of the holy covenant of marriage that
have persisted to the present day in most Christian
traditions-"one-flesh" union of a man and a
woman, procreation, and protection from sexual
sin. These rules and goals have been embodied in
the marriage laws of Catholic countries to the
present day.
Protestants-Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans,
and the offshoots thereof-denied that marriage
was a sacrament that conveyed saving grace on the
married couple. They also abolished celibate orders
and elevated marriage to a holy estate pleasing to
God. And they gave jurisdiction over marriage to
the state, not the church. However, all maintained
the natural, social, contractual, and religious
dimensions of marriage and the classic three
purposes. (Like the Catholics, Protestants regarded
homosexual behavior as sin and never could have
even conceived of homosexuals marrying.)
Lutherans emphasized the civil, social nature of
marriage, Calvinists emphasized its covenantal
character, and Anglicans made marriage the foundation of the commonwealth.
Each of these Protestant traditions was
ensconced in the laws of the societies in which they
were dominant, and the United States was an
inheritor primarily of the Catholic, Calvinist, and
Anglican notions. Indeed, the laws regulating
sexual ethics, marriage, and family life reflected
these deep-running religious notions up until the
middle of the twentieth century. It was only then
that laws against contraception, adultery, fornication, divorce, homosexuality, abortion, and illegitimacy began to fall.
the contractual view of marriage
Why were these laws struck down? Because a
new, stripped-down notion of marriage began to
replace the richer notions that held sway earlier.
That new notion began with the Enlightenment of

the eighteenth century. In that view the contractual
dimension of marriage is emphasized. Marriage is
understood as a bargain freely entered into by a
man and a woman. The two are assumed to be
rational, equal partners who mutually establish
rights by their marital agreements. This version
ignored the other dimensions of marriage as well as
its three classic purposes. Marriage became whatever two free individuals make it out to be. While
this approach certainly-and in many cases,
happily-increased the freedom of individuals, it
eroded the thicker dimensions of marriage.
It took a long time for this Enlightenment
notion to predominate in American law because of
the strong religious substance yet inherent in
American culture. This view first came to dominance in the law schools of America, whose legal
philosophies increasingly ignored the moral and
religious basis of law. The "legal reasoning" taught
in law schools became purely procedural-focused
on fair and rational processes-and rejected three
of the four traditional dimensions of marriage
while it ignored the three classic goods of marriage.
As individual rights have been pressed by plaintiffs
wanting to enter the institution of marriage,
lawyers and judges have slowly disconnected
marriage and family law from its foundations in
centuries of religiously-based moral convictions. As
the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently argued:
there are no "rational" grounds for marriage to be
reserved for only man/woman unions.
The last requirement-sexual complementarity-from the older notion of marriage is now
under fire. Not much else is legally intact from the
older notions of marriage that were outlined
above. If marriage has come to this, then, there are
few grounds to deny access to homosexuals to this
diminished institution. This thin, contractual
notion of marriage seemed to be the dominant one
in San Francisco recently when thousands of gay
and lesbian couples perfunctorily married, and
then were deputized to marry others. Each couple
made of marriage what they wished to make of it.
Indeed, this contractual notion cannot justify
refusing marriage to trios, groups, or family
members.
the challenge before us
But the story does not end here, as it does in
the more secularized countries in the West.
Americans as a whole adhere to the "thicker"
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notions of marriage that are being overlooked by
the law. They not only believe that marriage ought
to be between a man and a woman, but they believe
that it is oriented toward procreation, and should
be a permanent union characterized by sexual
fidelity. They hold to more traditional notions.

T H E SPECTACLE OF THOUSANDS OF HOMOSEX-

uals-as well as the many more thousands of
heterosexuals-"marrying" under this thin
contractual assumption is making people wonder
whether we need to bulk up our public notions of
marriage. Covenant marriage, replete with the
"thicker" notions mentioned above, has been
enacted in several states. A Constitutional
Amendment has been proposed that would guard
several of the traditional aspects of marriage.
Perhaps the underlying religious vigor in American
society can rebuild a network of laws that honor
these deeper meanings. This stronger version of
marriage may become the law of the land, with the
states left to work out whether or not they want to
legalize "unions" that are more contractual in
nature, as well as what sorts of legal benefits they
want to attach to them.
Americans should take note of Scandinavia,
where a thinner notion of marriage has been dominant for some time. Scandinavian marriage is not
sharply distinguished from co-habitation, so even
contractual marriage has diminished sharply. Gays
and lesbians have access to this version of marriage,
but not many enter it. This thin notion of marriage
has also been de-coupled from procreation so that
the few babies that are born are born overwhelmingly out of wedlock. Unstable couplings mean that
the few children born are brought up mostly by the
child care agencies of the state. Interestingly, by
contrast, in places where religious culture still
remains strong, marriage retains much of its traditional meaning, more children are born to married
couples, and marriage is more stable. Or so argues
Stanley Kurtz, in his widely-read report on "The
Death of Marriage in Scandinavia" (Weekly
Standard 9/20, 2 February 2004).
In view of all this, I would argue that the laws
governing marriage ought to be shored up to the
more rigorous notions held by the majority of
Americans. Marriage ought to be governed by
natural principles-the complementarity of the
sexes, by social concerns-that stable marriages of

biological parents are the best place to raise children for the sake of society, and by contractual
rules-that the consent of two competent, adult
persons be assured and guarded. Moreover, our
laws should recognize that marriage aims at the
permanent, faithful union (including sexual
fidelity) of a man and a woman, at procreation
(absolutely essential for the future of any society),
and at the restraint of a sexual disorder that can
cost so much to persons and the society. These are
civic meanings. Religious meanings can be added to
the many marriages that are blessed within various
religious traditions. Even without the meanings of
a religious ceremony, however, the civil meaning of
marriage ought to accord with the principles above.
Strong, legally mandated benefits ought to accrue
to the couples who enter this important social institution, so that marriage is honored and differentiated from co-habitation and other partnerships,
including homosexual ones. The children begotten
in these unions ought to bring further benefits to
the couple. Further, marriage ought to be difficult
to get into-couples should undergo mandatory
counseling-and even more difficult to exit-we
should end "no fault" divorce immediately.
the question of rights
If this more robust meaning of marriage
prevails, it seems clear that homosexuals do not
have the right to enter this social institution.
Marriage is defined by certain criteria that they
simply cannot meet. Homosexual behavior has
long been held to be an impediment to enter
marriage. Therefore, it is not unjust discrimination

to deny homosexuals-and other persons,
including many heterosexuals, who cannot meet
the criteria-entry to the social institution of
marriage that has been so honored in Western
history. Rather, it is simply applying the principles
that have been applied until very recently in every
society in all of Western history since the beginning
of the Christian era.
It is proper and important to halt the "defining
down" of marriage and to bring the legal definition
of marriage up to the basic moral convictions of the
majority of our citizens. Covenant marriage and
the proposed Amendment would help to do that.
However, all Americans enjoy many "negative"
rights that assure persons considerable freedom in
the private realm. Many homosexual and heterosexual pairs already live together in ample conditions of freedom. Homosexual unions can be
blessed by the churches and synagogues that wish
to do so without any fear of government interference. Further, some states may want to recognize
gay unions or non-sexually defined partnerships
and bestow on them certain rights and obligations.
But for the sake of a stable and wholesome
society, the laws regulating marriage must be
strengthened and extended to protect the essential
features of this venerable and indispensable social
institution. While properly excluding some, the
thriving social institution of marriage will be a
benefit to all.

f

Robert Benne directs the Roanoke College Center
for Religion and Society.

rc h ce
THE PRIVATE
COLLEGE IN TROUBLE
BY JOHN STRIETELMEIER
(first published May 1970)
Church-related colleges and
universities all over the country
are in trouble, and it takes no
special gift of prophecy to predict
that many of them will not survive
the decade of the Seventies.
To a very large extent, they
have only themselves to blame.
Nowhere in the Church is its
failure of nerve more evident than
in its colleges and universities.
Institutions which, in their best
days, prided themselves on being
distinctive now rejoice that one
can be on their campuses for
weeks at a time without having
reason to suspect that they are
affiliated with a Christian denomination. The spirit of what one of
my colleagues has aptly called
"me-too ism" has caught up many
a church-related institution and
made it over into a pale copy of
the secular school. And the tragedy
is that its administration, faculty,
and students so often mistake this
apostasy for maturity. For a
church-related college or university of this kind there is no hope
and we should rejoice to see it
depart the scene, for it cumbereth
the educational ground.
But there still remain many
church-related institutions which
deserve to survive.
On the lowest level, they
deserve to survive because they
offer a respectable alternative to
the publicly supported institution.
Unless we are to assume that
education is the natural monopoly
of the state, we need institutions
which will cater for elements of
wholesome variety in our culture.
There is a place for the college or
university which has some overarching theme around which all of
64165

The Cresset Trinity 12004

its teaching and learning are
organized-some useful ax to
grind, if you will. In the great days
of the University of Chicago,
Hutchins and Adler could tell you
what Chicago had to offer that no
other university could offer. And
so it has been at many another
private college or university, some
of them denominational.
But on a higher level the
Church needs to "test all things,
hold fast to that which is good."
And this has been the historical
role of the church-related college
or university at its best.
Unfortunately, it has played
this role with little support, either
financially or in terms of understanding, from its constituency.
Church people have too often
looked upon their colleges and
universities as primarily custodial
institutions for women and degree
mills for men and have doled out
just enough support to keep them
going at a low level of subsistence.
Now even this support is drying
up, and most seriously so in the
case of those denominational institutions which are trying hardest to
give their Church constituencies
something more and better than is
being asked of them.
To complicate matters, at this
very time when the good churchrelated institution is having the
greatest difficulty with its
constituency it is also having the
greatest difficulty with its own
students. The day when the undergraduate got all misty-eyed during
the singing of Alma Mater is over,
at least for the time being. The
student today sees Alma Mater as
an agency of the Establishment,
intent upon repressing him and
keeping him from doing his own
thing. So there is restlessness,
discontent, and occasional turmoil
on campus-all of them sufficient
grounds for many constituents to

conclude that the place has gone to
the dogs. Caught in the midst of
the Generation Gap-between
students who want total freedom
NOW and constituents who still
think of the college or university as
primarily a custodial institutionadministrators
and
faculty
members groan inwardly and begin
to wonder whether it would not be
best just to lock the place up.
But, of course; that is not the
answer. God must not be left
without witness in the intellectual
and academic world, however
great the problems may be of
maintaining that witness. The
answer is for church people to take
a greater interest in their colleges
and universities, to bring a greater
measure of sympathetic understanding to their problems, and to
share their affluence with these
institutions which are trying to do
a necessary job for them.
No doubt this sounds like the
sort of thing one gets from a
university's PR division. At its best,
Lutheran theology has always
maintained that men are capable
of speaking the truth, even PR
men, so we need not let that objection detain us. The fact of the
matter, though, is that the present
writer is a faculty member of some
twenty-three years tenure and with
a horror of shouting Wolf! If
anything, I have toned down my
concern so as not to give the
impression of over-reacting to the
problems which beset us in the
denominational school. My best
judgment is that the next five years
will decide whether my university,
and other church-related universities like it, will survive. I think
they should, that they deserve to,
that both the state and the Church
would be the poorer if they did
not. I can only hope that enough
people share this conviction and
will act upon it.

LOT'S WIFE
Who would not turn around
one last time, torn back
by the taste of ash,
a lingering incandescence,
unwilling to let go
before seeing again
the room where love was consummated,
the garden where the child plucked grapes,
the table where meat, bread, and wine
spread and spilled
for friends.
Who would not?
We root in the familiar, marking
our borders by the
carve of a chair, the twist of a road,
the known edge of a hill.
Not even grief, so woven
into the fabric of place
that we cannot watch trees
move in the wind without discerning
the weave of loss, keeps us from
glancing again.
Who would not turn?
A pillar of pain
whether you face the flame
or merely shuffle through its shadow.

He bids us find home
in him, strange, strong God
who calls us to leave our dead
unburied. Did Peter's wife object?
Did the torn nets and the aged father
not cry out to James and John?
Did the magdalene never wish to rest once
more
on the soft couch of sin? Surely at Nazareth
his mother must have yearned
to see the boy crawling
again among the shavings.
Brash, bold trust:
To shatter every mirror of
what we've been
in exchange for a distance
darkly seen,
promising nothing
but what
we must become.
Lot's wife resists. Ardent,
Robes whirling, she embraces her city.
The daughters and husband trudge on.

Anne M. Windholz
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higher learning for the twenty-first century. First, it
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vocation within a Christian community of learning
in order to prepare themselves for positions of
educational leadership within church-related institutions. Second, it maintains a collaborative
national network of church-related colleges and
universities that sponsors a variety of activities and
publications designed to explore the Christian
character of the academic vocation and to
strengthen the religious nature of church-related
institutions. Together these programs bring focus,
clarity, and energy to a critical aspect of a much
larger project: the imaginative reformulation and
implementation of an agenda for church-related
higher learning in the twenty-first century.
The Lilly Fellows Program is based in Christ
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Valparaiso University.
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Mercer University
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Rosemont College
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Saint Mary's University of Minnesota
St. Olaf College
Saint Xavier University
Samford University
Seattle Pacific University
Texas Lutheran University
University of Dallas
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University of Indianapolis
University of Notre Dame
University of St. Thomas
The University of Scranton
University of the South
Valparaiso University
Villanova University
Wartburg College
Westminster College-Pennsylvania
Westmont College
Wheaton College
Whitworth College
Wilberforce University
Wittenberg University
Wofford College
Xavier University-Cincinnati
Xavier University of Louisiana
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